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Abstract
Essays on Inequality, Education, Trade and Endogenous Growth
Joshua Dennis Hall
Advisor: Christopher A. Laincz, Ph.D.
Inequality grew substantially not only in many developed countries during the 1980s and
1990s, but also in most developing countries. Across developing and emerging economies,
the growth in inequality was more severe in Latin America and Africa compared with many
East Asian countries. The diverse patterns of income inequality motivate my research, which
reveals the important forces underlying the dynamics of inequality. In a general equilibrium,
endogenous growth model, I show trade liberalization for a developing country with a low
(high) quality of education induces a growth (reduction) of within country inequality during
the dynamic transition. Moreover, trade liberalization leads to significantly stronger conver-
gence in terms of per capita output when the quality of education is high in the developing
country. Using large set of developed and developing countries, I then provide empirical
evidence that technological progress increases the growth of inequality more in countries
with a low quality of education. Taken together, this research shows the interaction be-
tween technological change and educational quality emerges as a principal determinant of
the growth of inequality.

11. Within and Across Country Inequality in a Model of Trade and Endogenous
Growth
1.1 Introduction
The distribution of income across individuals and across countries has long been an
important issue in economics. This paper links income inequality both within and across
countries, and presents a mechanism that can explain the varied dynamics of inequality
among countries and regions. Within most developed and developing countries, the growth
of inequality accelerated substantially during the 1980s and 1990s. Focusing on developing
and emerging economies, the growth in inequality was more severe in Latin America and
Africa compared to many East Asian countries.1 Inequality across countries have also varied.
Per capita GDP in Latin America and Africa, on average, fell relative to the U.S., while
East Asia largely converged.2 In a general equilibrium model of North-South trade with
endogenous innovation (conducted by the North) and imitation (conducted by the South), I
account for the varied dynamics of within and across country inequality by focusing on the
quality of education and its interaction with technological progress. In the model, a higher
quality of education improves the ability of workers to adapt to new technologies. Trade
liberalization alters the pace of technological progress which, if the quality of education is low
(high), induces a growth (decline) of within country inequality and divergence (convergence)
in terms of per capita income during the dynamic transition.
In his seminal contribution, Kuznets (1955) suggests within country inequality will rise in
the early stages of development where investment in physical capital is the engine of growth,
yet decline in latter stages as human capital becomes the primary growth mechanism. To
address the continued growth of inequality within developed countries, the theoretical liter-
ature often identifies skill-biased technical change and globalization as sources of changing
1Uses inequality data from the University of Texas Inequality Project (available at
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html). The empirical evidence will be addressed in more detail in
the following section.
2Data on GDP per capita is taken from Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006).
2inequality. Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Caselli (1999),
Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Aghion et al. (2002) and Aghion (2002) focus on technological revolu-
tions that give rise to an increase in demand for skilled workers which puts upward pressure
on their relative wage. Acemoglu (1998) argues a sharp (exogenous) increase in the supply
of skilled workers raises the return to innovations targeted at skill-intensive sectors which
leads to an increase in their relative wage. Galor and Moav (2000) introduce the idea that
the rate of technological progress determines the relative demand, and reward, for skilled
labor.
The globalization argument (see Wood, 1994) stems from the Stopler-Samuelson theo-
rem where the reduction in impediments to trade with skill-scarce countries increases the
relative demand for skilled workers in the skill-abundant countries, and therefore raises the
skill premium. The theory also suggests trade liberalization decreases the relative demand
and premium for skills in less developed countries, which is not consistent with empirical ev-
idence. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999, 2006), Sener (2001), Acemoglu (2003), Grieben
(2005) and Zeira (2007) provide more unified models of technology and trade that avoid
the pitfalls of the Stopler-Samuelson theorem. Ripoll (2005) develops a general equilibrium
model of trade and finds that initial conditions, such as the skilled-unskilled labor ratio,
are important to the dynamics of income inequality following trade liberalization. While
these papers emphasize the relationship between technology, trade and inequality, this pa-
per focuses on why the dynamics of inequality differ among developing countries and also
considers the implications for inequality across countries.
In addition to addressing the dynamics of inequality within countries, this paper also
seeks to capture inequality across countries. The economic growth literature primarily fo-
cuses on the convergence hypothesis. The hypothesis generally asserts that differences in per
capita income between any pair of countries will be transitory as long as they possess iden-
tical technologies, preferences and population growth rates. Empirical papers have found
evidence that after controlling for savings rates and population growth rates, countries with
low initial levels of per capita output tend to grow faster than those with higher initial levels
3of per capita output. Quah (1996a, b) and Galor (1996), among others, offer a contrasting
view in which locally stable convergence clubs emerge, where there is a wide range of long
run per capita output levels.
To capture the varied patters of inequality within and across countries, I focus on the
interaction of the quality of education and the pace of technological progress. Workers are
differentiated on a continuum of innate ability and make a discrete choice at each point
in time as to whether acquire education and become a skilled worker, or remain unskilled,
based on their individual expected income. To become skilled, the worker forfeits a fraction
of their labor endowment to acquire education. This cost of education is decreasing in their
innate ability, or, education is “cheaper” for those with a higher ability.3 The benefits of
education are two-fold. First, skilled workers have a productivity advantage in production
relative to unskilled workers which is increasing in the rate technological progress. This
flows from Ferguson (1993) and Bartel and Sicherman (1999) who find that technological
progress increases the return to education.
The second benefit to acquiring costly education is a reduction in the time workers spend
adapting, or learning, new technologies. In this model, both skilled and unskilled workers
spend a portion of their labor endowment, not in production, but in this learning process.
Bartel and Sicherman (1998) show that an increase in the rate of technological progress
increases the need to (re)train workers, especially low skill workers. This feature is captured
in this model as the portion of time learning is increasing in the pace of technological
progress. For skilled workers, this learning cost is reduced. This introduces the role of the
quality of education. A higher quality of education reduces the time spent learning new
technologies for those who have made the discrete decision to acquire education.
Faster rates of technological progress have competing effects on the overall, effective hu-
man capital supplied to production. First, an increase in the rate of technological progress
increases the relative productivity of skilled workers inducing more workers to acquire educa-
tion and become skilled. This effect increases overall human capital. Second, faster rates of
3This assumption is line with Griliches and Mason (1972) and Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) who
find individual earnings increase with ability. In this model, because the cost of education is decreasing in
ability, higher ability workers devote more of labor endowment to income earning production.
4technological progress increase the time needed to learn and adapt to the new technologies,
reducing the effective labor supply to production which decreases overall human capital. A
higher quality of education reduces the strength of this second effect, and thus increases the
marginal impact of an increase of technological progress on overall human capital. The over-
all impact of faster rates of technological progress is determined by the quality of education
which is a key feature of the model.
The model is solved numerically using reasonable parameter values. I focus on the
income inequality both within and across countries following Southern trade liberalization.4
I consider two specific cases referring the quality of education in the South. The first is when
the South has a low quality of education and the second is when the South has a higher
quality of education.
In the long run, Southern trade liberalization increases the rate of technological progress
and economic growth under both cases by a similar magnitude. Long run inequality within
countries unambiguously increases in both the North and South due to the increased pace of
technological progress, while long run inequality across countries decreases. The per capita
income of Southern workers increase relative to Northern workers, however total profits for
Northern producers of intermediate goods increase relative to Southern producers of in-
termediate goods. The intuition is that Northern producers face lower costs of exporting
intermediate goods to the South following trade liberalization. Overall, the quality of ed-
ucation in the South does not significantly change the long run, qualitative implications of
Southern trade liberalization.
The transitional dynamics of inequality within and across counties depend significantly
on the quality of education in the South. In the case in which the South has a low quality
of education, the rate of technological progress jumps initially, continues to increase in the
initial periods of the transition, before declining to an overall higher rate of technological
progress in the long run steady state. In contrast, when the quality of education is relatively
high in the South, after an initial jump, the rate of technological progress declines in the
4In this class of models, the South refers a developing or emerging economy, whereas the North represents
a developed country. Northern trade liberalization and bilateral trade liberalization experiments are possible
in the context of this model. In the present paper, I focus on Southern trade liberalization.
5early portion of the transition before increasing to a higher long run equilibrium. The
nonmonotonic transitional dynamics are directly due to the quality of education in the South.
When the quality of education is low, the initial jump in the rate of technological progress
following trade liberalization reduces overall human capital in the South (for the reasons
discussed above), which limits their ability to imitate and further increases the incentives for
Northern firms to innovate. The initial jump in the rate of technological progress increases
overall human capital when the quality of education is high. This increases the ability to
imitate in the South, reducing the incentives for Northern firms to innovate, and leads to
the decline in the rate of technological progress in the early stages of the dynamic transition.
Inequality within countries follow the nonmonotonic transition of the rate of technolog-
ical progress. Focusing on the initial periods following trade liberalization, within country
inequality declines when the quality of education in the South is high, but increases when
the quality of education is low. In addition, the per capita income of Southern workers
converge to that in the North in both the transition and in the long run when their quality
of education is high. Per capita income for Southern workers, conversely, diverges during
the initial periods of the transition when the quality of education is low. The quality of
education emerges as an important determinant of the varied dynamics of within and across
country inequality observed in the data. Empirical evidence supports this claim. Using
data compiled by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), which provides a measure for the quality
of education based on math and science scores, I provide empirical evidence which shows
a higher quality of education both directly reduces the growth of within country inequality
and the marginal impact of technological diffusion on inequality, which is consistent with
results of this model.5 In addition, Hanushek and Kimko use their measure to show the
quality of education is positively related to the economic growth in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides an overview
the empirical motivation; Section 1.3 introduces the model; Section 1.4 details the steady-
state and transitional dynamics; Section 1.5 discusses the implications of Southern trade
liberalization on within and across country inequality; and Section 1.6 concludes.
5See the followin chapter.
61.2 Empirical Motivation
1.2.1 Within Country Income Inequality
The empirical literature on within-country income inequality is extensive. By most
measures, inequality within the United States and other industrialized countries rose from
the 1970s until 2000 (Wood, 1994; Machin, 1996; Autor et al., 2005). However, among
developing countries there is no such clear pattern. Latin America, for example, experienced
a growth in income inequality, while inequality within many East Asian countries declined.
Hanson and Harrison (1999) show the skilled/unskilled wage gap grew in Mexico during the
1980s. Robbins (1996) and Wood (1997) find inequality also grew in Hong Kong, Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Mexico, but fell in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and
Malaysia during the same period. Das (2002), similarly, finds rising income inequality in
Mexico and Chile, and falling inequality within Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. Duryea
and Szekely (2000) and Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2000), on-the-other-hand, show
inequality fell within Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia, and was constant
in Chile and Costa Rica during the 1980s and 1990s. Michaely et al. (1991) show a rise
and then fall of inequality within Singapore and Sri Lanka. Zhu and Trefler (2001) find that
out of 29 developing countries, inequality is rising in 16 countries and falling (or remaining
constant) in 13 countries.
The empirical literature focusing on the dynamics of within country inequality is certainly
mixed. To provide a more uniform consideration of within country inequality, Figure 1.1
shows the median of the log change of the Theil index for five country cohorts: advanced
countries, Middle Eastern and North African countries, Latin American countries, Sub-
Saharan African countries and Asian countries (UTIP-UNIDO, 2002). The data spans from
1960 until 1995 and is broken up into six ten-year periods. This measure, first introduced
by Theil (1967), is a consistent measurement of inequality based on industrial wages in the
manufacturing sector published annually by the United Nations Development Organization.6
6Another commonly used measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient (Deininger and Squire, 1996; 1998).
However, this measures the concentration of income based on household surveys (See Deininger and Squire,
1996). Conceicao and Galbraith (2000) and others also find this measure to be incomplete in terms of
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Figure 1.1: Median log change in the Theil index over ten year intervals for five country
cohorts: Advanced economics, Middle East/North Africa, Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
For each country the data were averaged around years given. For example, the Theil for
1980 is the average of 1978-1982 and the value for 1990 is the average of 1988-1992 for each
country.
8The median growth of inequality was negative or zero for each of the five groups of
countries between 1965 and 1975, as well as from 1970 to 1980. However, the growth of
inequality accelerated substantially during the 1980s for most groups of countries. The
relative magnitude of the growth of inequality in the 1980s is also important. Inequality
grew substantially more in Latin America and Africa relative to the other three cohorts,
while the growth of inequality was lowest in the Asian countries for the periods 1980-1990
and 1985-1995.
1.2.2 Across Country Income Inequality
When addressing inequality across countries, one approach is to view countries as a
unit of measure. Under this assumption, the empirical convergence literature established
divergence in GDP per capita, most notably due to the poor economic performance of many
Latin American and African countries. Specifically, the growth rates of poor countries have
been lower than the growth rates of rich countries,7 and the dispersion of income per capita
across countries has increased over time.8
This finding of divergence, however, is not robust when considering the individual as
the unit of measure. The convergence of more populous regions, including China and India,
drives a decline in global inequality across all individuals. Overall, recent empirical evidence
suggests that after peaking around 1979 global inequality is declining (See Sala-i-Martin,
2006).
Abstracting from the convergence debate, the focus of this paper is why certain countries
diverged and others converged in terms of average GDP per capita relative to that in the
United States. Figure 1.2 uses data from the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009)
to show the GDP per capita relative to the U.S. GDP per capita for a subset of African,
Latin American and East Asian countries from 1960 to 2002. Figure 1.2 shows East Asia,
on average, converged substantially in terms of living standards, while both Latin America
and Africa experienced divergence. Also, the convergence of East Asia and the divergence of
country coverage over time and largely inconsistent with other measures of inequality.
7β-divergence in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) terms.
8σ-divergence in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). See the “twin peaks” literature following Quah (1993).
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Figure 1.2: Median of the real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. for 3 country cohorts.
For each country, the relative GDP per capita was averaged over 5 year intervals, then the
median for each year group was calculated. The Asian sample included 14 countries; 11
countries were included in South America; and 37 countries in the African sample.
Latin America and Africa accelerated during the 1980s. This decade is known for widespread
trade liberalization among developing countries, which suggests that opening to trade and
new technologies that flow into the country may be an important source of the dynamics of
income inequality.
1.2.3 Quality of Education
The quality of education varies widely across countries. Standard measures for edu-
cational quality, including adult literacy rates, teacher-pupil ratios, or expenditures per
student, are typically insignificant in cross-country growth studies, and are notoriously poor
measures for the quality of education in the labor force. A potential reason is that these
measures to do not directly capture the cognitive ability of the labor force. Hanushek and
Kimko (2000) address this issue and develop measures for the quality of the labor force de-
rived from a number of international mathematics and science tests between the years 1965
through 1991. While test score data is available for only 38 countries, Hanushek and Kimko
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use consistent estimators to forecast labor force quality for a large number of countries based
on country specific characteristics. In all, they produce quality measures for 90 countries
across the development spectrum. Table A.1 in the appendix provides the quality indices
derived in Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
The quality of the labor force is consistently higher in Asia relative to Latin America,
and the measure performs well in cross-country growth regressions. Using the Hanushek and
Kimko measure, the poorest quality of the labor force is 18.26 (Iran), while the highest is
72.13 (Singapore). The mean for the entire sample of countries is 51.28. Overall, this data
supports the idea that the quality of education varies significantly and systematically across
countries and regions.
1.3 The Model
The model features North-South trade with Schumpeterian endogenous growth through
creative destruction in continuous time. The North represents a developed country, while the
South represents a less developed country. Innovations increase the quality, or productivity,
of intermediate goods used in final goods production. State-of-the-art quality levels are
only discovered through research and development (R&D) efforts in the North, but once an
innovation occurs, the South undertakes R&D to imitate the Northern frontier technology.
Human capital is an input for final goods production. As introduced by Galor and Moav
(2000), the rate at which new state-of-the-art technologies enter the production process
determines, in part, the level of effective human capital in the economy. The effective human
capital in the economy is a weighted sum of skilled and unskilled workers whose productivity
and effective supply to production are determined by the quality of the education and the
rate of technological progress.
1.3.1 Final Goods Sector
The final goods production function includes a conventional quality ladder model, a la
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
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(1997, 2004). In this setup technology is embedded within the productivity, or quality, of
the intermediate goods used in producing a final good. Denote the productivity of a given
intermediate good industry j to be qkj , where q is the incremental rise in productivity per
innovation, and k is the number of innovations. Assume a continuum of intermediate goods,
j ∈ [0, 1].
Final goods production in each region m ∈ [N (North) , S (South)] takes the Cobb-
Douglas functional form,
Ym = Am (LmHm)
1−α
∫ 1
0
(
qkNj xmkj
)α
dj (1.3.1)
where α is the share of capital in production, Am is the total factor productivity parameter
in the final goods sector, xmkj is the physical quantity of intermediate good j with quality
level k, and qkNj xmkj is the quality adjusted input for the intermediate good from industry
j. The inclusion of N in qkNj indicates that in equilibrium only the highest quality of
intermediate good will be used in final goods production, which by definition, is discovered
only through Northern innovative activity. Hm represents the effective human capital of each
country. Embedded within H are the contributions of both skilled and unskilled workers,
whose supply and productivity are both endogenous and determined in equilibrium. Lm is
the size of the population, normalized to LN = 1 in the North. For simplicity, there is no
population growth and workers are immobile across countries.
The inverse demand for an intermediate good x from industry j is
Pj = αP˜m (LmHm)
1−α
xα−1mkj q
kNjα (1.3.2)
where Pj is the price of the intermediate good from industry j, and P˜m is the price of
the (nontradeable) final good. The price of the Northern final good, P˜N , is the numeraire,
P˜N ≡ 1. Therefore, P˜S is defined as the relative price of the final good in the South. As
later sections discuss, P˜S is endogenous, and adjusts in every period to balance trade.
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1.3.2 Human Capital
Individuals choose between working as skilled or unskilled based on their expected in-
come, thus the supply of each type of labor is endogenous. Workers are differentiated by
their innate, cognitive ability which is reflected in their individual cost of education. A
uniformly distributed continuum of individuals i in each region is indexed by ability ami.
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor at every point in time. To become skilled,
the individual devotes a fraction of their labor endowment to the acquisition of education.
The effective supply of labor to production for individual i as a skilled, hmi, or unskilled,
lmi worker takes the form of:
hmi = ami − 1
δm
(1− ami) pI (1.3.3)
or
lmi = 1− (1− ami) pI (1.3.4)
efficiency units of labor to final goods production. The first term on the right hand side of
equations (1.3.3) and (1.3.4) captures the labor endowment net costs of education. An un-
skilled worker supplies their full labor endowment of 1 to production, while a skilled worker
supplies ami to production. The remaining 1− ami is lost due to the cost of education. The
second term on the right hand side is the time cost required for worker i to adapt to new
technologies. This time cost is increasing in pI which is the (endogenous) instantaneous
probability of innovation, which captures the pace at which new technologies are entering
the production process. Faster rates of innovation reduce the effective supply of labor to
production. This learning cost is decreasing in ability (ie. higher ability workers learn and
adapt to new technologies at a faster pace). Finally, δm > 1 is the quality of education re-
ceived by skilled workers who made the costly investment into acquiring education. A higher
quality of education reduces the time that skilled workers need to learn new technologies.
I assume that in equilibrium 1 > pI ≥ 0, and choose parameters such that this inequality
holds in steady state and during each moment in the dynamic transition. The second part of
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this inequality ensures that the endogenous instantaneous probability of innovation is non-
negative. The first part of the inequality ensures that the worker with the lowest ability will
have a non-negative supply of production labor (after subtracting the time spent learning
new technologies) as either a skilled or unskilled worker.
In the spirit of Galor and Moav (2000), the aggregate effective human capital H is given
by a weighted sum of the endogenous aggregate effective labor supply of skilled and unskilled
workers. The effective human capital takes the form of,
Hm = (1 + δmpI)hm + lm, (1.3.5)
where hm =
∫
hmi
hmidami and lm =
∫
lmi
lmidami are the total effective supply of labor to
production for skilled and unskilled workers.9 A higher quality of education, δm, increases
the relative productivity of skilled workers who made the costly investment into acquiring ed-
ucation. Finally, faster rates of technological progress also increase the relative productivity
of skilled workers.
Using equations (1.3.1) and (1.3.5), the competitive wages for skilled (s) and unskilled
(u) workers in country m are
wsm ≡ ωm (1 + δmpI) and wum ≡ ωm, (1.3.6)
where ωm ≡ (1− α) P˜mYmHm is the marginal product of overall human capital. Income is the
wage rate times the efficiency units of labor supplied. The individual with ability ami earns
income Ismi working as a skilled worker, or I
u
mi if unskilled:
Skilled ⇒ Ismi = wsmhmi = wsm
(
ami − 1δm (1− ami) pI
)
Unskilled ⇒ Iumi = wumlmi = wum (1− (1− ami) pI) .
(1.3.7)
At each point in time, worker i makes the discrete choice of whether to acquire education
9Introducing imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is possible, but the qualitative
results would carry through and the analysis would be less transparent.
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and work as skilled or remained unskilled by maximizing potential income as skilled, Ismi,
or unskilled, Iumi. There is a single threshold level of ability, a
∗
m, such that all workers with
ability 1 > ami > a∗m choose to acquire education and work as skilled, while all workers with
ability 0 < ami < a∗m remain unskilled. It is straightforward to show that I
s
m (ai = 0) < 0,
Ium (ai = 0) > I
s
m (ai = 0) and I
s
m (ai = 1) > I
u
m (ai = 1). Since income for skilled and
unskilled workers are increasing in ability in a linear fashion, there is a single worker whose
ability is such that Ium (ai = a
∗) = Ism (ai = a
∗).
The threshold ability level of the worker indifferent from becoming skilled or remaining
unskilled is given by a∗m:
a∗m =
1− pI + (1 + δmpI) pIδm
1− pI + (1 + δmpI) pIδm + δmpI
. (1.3.8)
Any worker with ability 1 > ami > a∗m will choose to become skilled, while the rest, 0 <
ami < a
∗
m, choose to remain unskilled. a
∗ is interpreted as the fraction of workers of workers
who choose to remain unskilled for a given quality of education and the rate of technological
progress.
Figure 1.3 plots the skilled and unskilled incomes across individuals. The dark line shows
the maximum potential income for each individual. Moreover, Figure 1.3 shows the impact
of an increase in the rate of technological progress on the educational decisions in each
country. For a given ability level, an increase in the rate of technological progress lowers the
income of working as unskilled and increases the income of working as skilled. As a result,
more workers will make the discrete choice to acquire education.
The threshold level of ability decreases in the quality of education which implies that
an increase in the quality of education will increase the fraction of workers which choose to
acquire education:
∂a∗m
∂δm
= − pI (1− pI) +
p2I
δm
(2 + δmpI)(
1− pI + (1 + δmpI) pIδm + δmpI
)2 < 0. (1.3.9)
An increase in the rate of technological progress also decreases the threshold level of
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Skilled and Unskilled Income
Income
Increase pI to pI′
Skilled
Unskilled
Ability
a*( pI′) a*( pI )
Figure 1.3: Denotes the income for each individual i as a skilled or unskilled worker. Workers
maximize income and make their educational decision based on expected income.
ability. Faster rates of technological progress increase the fraction of workers choosing to
acquire education:
∂a∗m
∂pI
= − δm
(
1− p2I
)(
1− pI + (1 + δmpI) pIδm + δmpI
)2 < 0. (1.3.10)
The total effective supply of labor is given by aggregating individual labor supplies. This
yields
hm =
∫ 1
a∗m
ami − 1δm (1− ami) pIdami = 12
(
1 + pIδm
)(
1− (a∗m)2
)
− pIδm (1− a∗m)
lm =
∫ a∗m
0
1− (1− ami) pIdami = pI2 (a∗m)2 + a∗m (1− pI) .
(1.3.11)
The total effective supply of skilled and unskilled workers is their total labor endowment
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less the cost of education for skilled workers (first term in the far right equations), less their
total learning cost (final term in above equations). The total effective human capital level
is given by substituting equations (1.3.11) and (1.3.8) into equation (1.3.5). Rearranging
(1.3.5) yields
Hm =
[
1
2
(1 + δmpI)
(
1− (a∗m)2
)
+ a∗m
]
−
[
pI
2
(
(1 + δmpI)
(1− a∗m)2
δm
+ a∗m (2− a∗m)
)]
.
(1.3.12)
Equation (1.3.12) breaks the overall effective human capital into two primary components.
The first set of brackets is the productivity adjusted labor supply of skilled and unskilled
workers less the cost of education for skilled workers. The second set of brackets is the pro-
ductivity adjusted loss of labor supply due to the time spent learning new technologies. The
derivative of Hm with respect to pI is ambiguous and depends on the quality of education.
An increase in the rate of technological progress unambiguously increases the first bracket in
two ways. First, skilled workers become more productive, and second, more workers make
the choice to become skilled. Faster rates of technological progress, however, reduce the
term in the second set of brackets because workers spend more time adapting to new tech-
nologies rather than in production. This effect is partially offset as more workers become
skilled because skilled workers are better able to adapt to new technologies given.
Consider how overall effective human capital depends on pI :
∂Hm
∂pI
=
[
δm
2
(
1− a2m
)]
+
[
(1− am (1 + δmpI)) ∂a
∗
m
∂pI
]
−
[
1
2 (1 + δmpI)
(1−a∗m)2
δm
+ a∗m (2− a∗m)
]
−
[
pI
(
1− amδm + am (1 + pI)
)
∂a∗m
∂pI
]
(1.3.13)
The partial derivative ∂Hm/∂pI is positive or negative depending on the rate of techno-
logical progress and the quality of education. From equation (1.3.13), the first bracket is the
gain in productivity for skilled workers, the second bracket is the change in the composition
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Figure 1.4: Denotes aggregate human capital for a given level of pI . Parameter values are
given below.
of the workforce, the third bracket is the loss due to the increased time needed to adapt
to new technologies, and the fourth bracket is the benefit of more skilled workers lowering
the overall amount of time workers need to learn new technologies. In addition, a higher
quality of education, δm, increases the positive impact of the first bracket, ensures that
the second bracket is positive, lowers the magnitude of the third bracket and increases the
magnitude of the final bracket. Figure 1.4 shows how the effective human capital depends
on the interaction of the quality of education and the rate of technological progress.
For the discussion that follows, for a given change in pI , a country with education
parameters such that ∂H/∂pI < 0 is considered to have a low quality of education, while
a country with parameters such that ∂H/∂pI > 0 is considered to have a high quality of
education. Equation (1.3.13) implies that an increase in the rate of technological progress
will increase the effective human capital for countries with a sufficiently high quality of
education, but could decrease if the quality of education is sufficiently low.
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1.3.3 Income Inequality Within Countries
This section derives the relationship between technical innovation, the quality of educa-
tion, and income inequality within countries. Inequality across countries will be addressed
in a subsequent section.
Within country inequality is defined to be the average income of skilled workers relative
to the average income of unskilled workers. Exploiting the linearity of incomes with respect
to ability, average incomes for skilled, I˜sm, and unskilled, I˜
u
m workers are
I˜sm =
Ism(a
∗
m)+I
s
m(1)
2 =
1
2w
s
m
(
1 + a∗m − pIδm (1− a∗m)
)
I˜um =
Ium(a
∗
m)+I
u
m(0)
2 =
1
2w
u
m (1 + a
∗
m − pI (2− a∗m)) .
(1.3.14)
Using the average incomes for the two types of labor, within-country inequality for both
the North and South is expressed as
Ωs/um =
I˜sm
I˜um
= (1 + δmpI)
(
1 + a∗m − pIδm (1− a∗m)
1 + a∗m − pI (2− a∗m)
)
. (1.3.15)
1.3.4 Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector follows a two-stage process: 1) the process of research
and development; and 2) monopolistic competition given the stage one R&D results. The
first stage is the allocation of resources into the research and development (R&D) of new
technologies. The North, by assumption, alone possesses the capability to invent a new
state-of-the-art technology. If there is R&D success in the North in a given industry j, then
the quality of that intermediate good rises by a constant size, q, from qkj to the new quality
level qkj+1, where k is the number of innovations. Since Northern firms have the ability
to create new technologies, they must innovate in order to expand the world’s technology
frontier. R&D in the South is conducted to imitate frontier technologies.
In the second stage, the successful firms set prices and realize the rents from innovation or
imitation. Within intermediate industries, competing firms holding different quality grades
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of a substitutable intermediate good engage in Bertrand price competition. Under the
condition that q < 1/α, firms follow a limit price strategy.10 Following Grossman and
Helpman (1991), limit pricing drives lower quality grades within a given industry out of the
market.
The location of production for intermediate j depends on the stage one R&D results.
Following a successful innovation in industry j, the Northern firm serves as the global source
for that good. That firm supplies the domestic demand and the foreign demand through
exporting. The Northern firm holds the market until either a competing Northern firm
makes a further innovation, or the quality grade is successfully imitated by a Southern
competitor. Following successful imitation in industry j, the Southern firm serves, again, as
the global source by exporting to the North. By assumption, Southern firms have a marginal
cost advantage and are able to drive Northern competitors out of the market. Assuming a
continuum of industries with a mass of one, nNN is defined as the share of industries served
by a firm located in the North whose competitor with the next highest quality grade is a
fellow Northern firm, nNS is the share of industries served by a firm located in the North
whose competitor with the next highest grade is located in the South, and nS are the share
of industries with production in the South.11
Stage 2: Expected Profits
Profits are determined by the type of competition faced by each type of firm. Due to
the assumption of nondrastic innovations, firms engage in limit pricing strategies. Bertrand
price competition results in prices set just low enough to drive the closest competitor (the
firm with the next highest quality grade) out of the market. Northern firms facing Northern
competition choose the lowest price at which the previous innovator, or closet competitor,
could sell before earning negative profits. Since new innovations are q > 1 units more
productive than the next best good (in this case held by a competing Northern firm), the
10If this inequality does not hold, successful innovators charge monopoly prices and successful imitators
engage in limit pricing strategies.
11Intermediate producers in the South only face competition from the North. Bertrand price competition
drives prices down to marginal costs, thus fellow intermediate firms in the South have no incentive to devote
resources to imitate a good that has already been imitated.
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innovating firm charges a price q times the marginal cost of their rival in order to completely
capture the market for that industry. Northern firms facing Northern competition charge a
domestic price PNN = (q − )MCN = q, where  is an arbitrarily small positive amount.
Notice, the marginal cost of intermediate producers is equal to the price of the final good
in that region. In the North, the price of the final good and therefore the marginal cost
for intermediate firms in the North is unity, while the price of the Southern final good and
marginal costs for Southern intermediate producers adjust to balance trade, P˜S = MCS < 1.
This price is sufficient to capture the entire market for that industry. In the export market,
similar intuition implies P ∗NN = q (1 + τXS), where τXS is the tariff imposed by the South.
For a Northern firm facing Southern competition, the innovating firm charges a price q−
over the marginal cost of the Southern competitor. In the Northern market, the effective
marginal cost for a Southern firm is MCS (1 + τXN ), where τXN is the tariff imposed by
the North. Thus, Northern firms facing Southern competition charge the domestic price,
PNS = qMCS (1 + τXN ) = qP˜S (1 + τXN ). In the Southern market, the marginal cost for a
Southern firm is simply MCS , so the export price is P ∗NS = qMCS = qP˜S .
Finally, Southern firms always face Northern competition, and capture the global market
by charging a price 1 −  times the marginal cost of the Northern firm. In the Northern
market, the marginal cost for a Northern firm is MCN = 1, and the price is P ∗j = 1. In
the South, Southern firms price at PS = 1 + τXS . Table 1.1 summarizes the limit pricing
schedule and the effective marginal cost of production for each type of firm.
The pricing strategies for intermediate firms reveals the role of barriers to trade in the
model. Trade liberalization alters the limit prices for the three types of firms, and thus,
changes demand, expected profits and ultimately the incentives for innovation and imitation.
Rearranging equation (1.3.2) and using Table 1.1, the domestic and foreign demand for each
type of firm is given by
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Limit Pricing Schedule and Effective Marginal Cost
PNN = q MCNN = 1
P ∗NN = q (1 + τXS) MC
∗
NN = 1 + τXS
PNS = qP˜S (1 + τXN ) MCNS = 1
P ∗NS = qP˜S MC
∗
NS = 1 + τXS
PS = 1 + τXS MCS = P˜S
P ∗S = 1 MC
∗
S = P˜S (1 + τXN )
Table 1.1: Summarizes the limit prices for each type of firm in both the domestic and export
markets. The effective marginal cost is the true marginal cost of production adjusted for
tariffs.
nNN ⇒ XNN = HN
(
ANαq
kNjα 1
q
)1/(1−α)
X∗NN = LSHS
(
ASαq
kNjα P˜S
q(1+τXS)
)1/(1−α)
nNS ⇒ XNS = HN
(
ANαq
kNjα 1
qP˜S(1+τXN )
)1/(1−α)
X∗NS = LSHS
(
ASαq
kNjα P˜S
qP˜S
)1/(1−α)
nS ⇒ XS = LSHS
(
ASαq
kNjα P˜S
1+τXS
)1/(1−α)
X∗S = HN
(
ANαq
kNjα 1
1
)1/(1−α)
(1.3.16)
Successful innovators and imitators earn the sum of domestic and export profits. Total
profits are
Domestic Profits
pij =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Pj −MCj)Xj +
(
P ∗j −MC∗j
)
X∗j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Profits
where Pj , P ∗j , MCj and MC
∗
j are given in Table 2 for j ∈ [NN,NS, S]. I assume trade
barriers are sufficiently low that export profits are always positive.
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The average expected profits in the North and South are summarized as
piN ≡ p¯iNQN , where ∂p¯iN
∂τXS
< 0, and
∂p¯iN
∂τXN
< 0 (1.3.17)
and
piS ≡ p¯iSQN , where ∂p¯iS
∂τXS
> 0, and
∂p¯iN
∂τXN
< 0, (1.3.18)
where p¯iN and p¯iS are the quality adjusted expected profits for firms in the North and
South, respectively, and QN =
∫ 1
0
qkNjα/(1−α)dj is the average quality level on the frontier.
Equations (1.3.17) and (1.3.18) are dependent on the barriers to trade, τXS and τXN , and
the rate of technological progress which is embedded within the effective human capital in
the North and South. See the appendix for additional details.
Stage 1: Research & Development
Intermediate firms decide the amount of resources to devote to R&D based on the ex-
pected present value of profits for successful research. This, in turn, depends on the prob-
abilities of innovation (I) and imitation (C for copying). This section will draw heavily
on the work of Connolly and Valderrama (2005, 2007), most notably by incorporating the
concept of “learning-to-learn,” which allows for past R&D experience to increase the ability
to innovate or imitate.
Let pIkj and pCkj denote the instantaneous probability of innovation and imitation,
respectively, for industry j with current quality level k. The probabilities of research success
per unit of time follow a Poisson process depending on the resources devoted to R&D and
the quality level in that industry. For the aggregate economy, it is sufficient to characterize
the rates of technical progress by looking at the average quality. QN is the average frontier
technology, and QS is average quality of Southern intermediates.
In the North, the instantaneous probability of innovation is given by
pI = φIf (QN )ZN (1.3.19)
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where φI is the productivity parameter for the Northern R&D sector, ZN are the resources
devoted to innovative R&D in the North and f (QN ) is a function that captures the effect
of the current technology on the probability of innovation. For simplicity, the function f is
defined as
f (QN ) = Q−1N .
This specification captures the idea that new innovations become increasingly complex and,
thus, innovation becomes more difficult as the average quality level rises. In-other-words,
the easiest innovations are discovered first making it increasingly difficult to innovate over
time.
In the South, the instantaneous probability of imitation for the aggregate economy is
pC = φCg (QS , QN )ZS (1.3.20)
where φC is the productivity parameter for the Southern R&D sector, ZS are the average
resources devoted to R&D and g (QS , QN ) captures three effects of the current technological
environment on the probability of imitation. The first effect is the positive effect of QS
reflecting learning-to-learn in the South.12 Higher QS implies greater experience with the
imitative process which reduces the costs of imitation. The second effect is the increasing
difficulty in imitating good of a higher quality. As the frontier expands, innovations are
increasingly complex, and costs of imitation increase. Finally, imitation becomes increasingly
costly as the aggregate quality in the South catches up to the Northern aggregate quality.
The relative quality of the South is defined as Qˆ ≡ QS/QN . Intuitively, as the South
approaches the North in terms of quality, the pool of potential imitations shrinks, with
only the most complex innovations left available for imitation. Thus, the costs of imitation
increase as Qˆ increases. Considering these three effects, the functional form of g is defined
as
g (QS , QN ) = QSQ−2N Qˆ
−σ = Qˆ1−σQ−1N
12For more details on learning-to-learn effects refer to Connolly (2003) and Connolly and Valderrama
(2005, 2007).
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where σ > 1 represents how quickly the imitation rates fall as the South approaches the
aggregate quality level in the North. The inclusion of Qˆ guarantees smooth transitional
dynamics. Furthermore, if the South completely catches up to the North in terms of average
quality, or QS = QN , the function g is equivalent to the function f .
1.3.5 Income Inequality Across Countries
Total income in each country is the sum of worker income and firm profits. Total per
capita income (controlling for the relative size of the South, LS) is given by
North ⇒ ∫ a∗N
0
IuN (aNi) daNi +
∫ 1
a∗N
IsN (aNi) daNi = (1− α) Y¯NQN
South ⇒ 1LS
[∫ a∗S
0
IuS (aSi) daSi +
∫ 1
a∗S
IsS (aSi) daSi
]
= 1LS
[
(1− α) Y¯S
]
QN ,
(1.3.21)
and total per capita firm profits are given by
North ⇒ [nNN p¯iNN + nNS p¯iNS ]QN
South ⇒ 1LS [nS p¯iS ]QN ,
(1.3.22)
where Y¯N = YNQN , Y¯S =
YS
QN
, p¯iNN = piNNQN , p¯iNS =
piNS
QN
, and p¯iS = piSQN are the aggregate final
goods and profits divided by the aggregate quality index.
In the subsequent analysis, I will focus on two measures of inequality across countries.
The first only considers the per capita income of the workers, while the second includes the
profits of the firms. Using separate measures of inequality across countries in this way will
make the analysis below more clear as to what is driving the dynamics of inequality across
countries. Consider the following two measures of inequality across countries:
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ΩN/S1 =
Y¯N
1
LS
Y¯S
ΩN/S2 =
(1−α)Y¯N+nNN p¯iNN+nNS p¯iNS
1
LS
[(1−α)Y¯S+nS p¯iS]
(1.3.23)
Notice the level of the aggregate quality of intermediate goods has no effect on inequality
across countries. In both the North and the South, aggregate output and profits for each
type of firm grow at an equal rate of Q˙NQN . Total income and profits in the South are divided
by LS to transform this measure of inequality into per-capita terms.
1.3.6 Consumers
Consumers live in either the North or the South and are immobile across countries.
Consumer i makes consumption and savings decisions to maximize the present value of
lifetime utility. There is no trade in final goods and so the consumers only have access to
domestically produced final goods. The general consumer problem is
max
Cmi,bmi
∫ ∞
0
u (Cmi) e−ρtdt (1.3.24)
subject to
b˙mi = Imi + rmbmi − P˜mCmi. (1.3.25)
where Cmi is the consumption of individual i in region m, rm is the endogenously determined
country specific interest rate, Imi is the income for individual i in region m, and bmi is the net
assets for person i in region m. Using a constant elasticity of substitution utility function:
u (Cmi) =
C1−θmi − 1
1− θ ,
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the usual expressions for consumption growth are:
C˙N
CN
=
1
θ
(rN − ρ) (1.3.26)
C˙S
CS
=
1
θ
(
rS −
˙˜PS
P˜S
− ρ
)
(1.3.27)
where 1/θ is the constant elasticity of substitution for all consumers in both regions. The
growth rates of consumption are independent of the individual income level and are equal
across all individuals within the region.
1.4 The Steady-State and Transitional Dynamics
1.4.1 The Steady-State
The model is defined by a system of five dynamic equations, given two aggregate resource
constraints and the balanced trade condition. In steady-state, the relative aggregate quality
level of the South must be constant, or, ˙ˆQ/Qˆ = 0; the distribution of intermediate firms
must be constant, or, n˙NN = n˙NS = n˙S = 0; and the growth of consumption must equal
the growth rate of technology, or, C˙N/CN = C˙S/CS = Q˙N/QN .
Aggregate Resource Constraint and Balanced Trade
Substituting for the prices and demand of intermediate goods, aggregate output for the
North and South, respectively, is:
YN = HNΛN
( q
α
)[
nNN + nNS
(
1
P˜S (1 + τXN )
) α
1−α
+ nSq
α
1−α
]
QN (1.4.1)
YS = LSHSΛS
( q
α
)( P˜S
1 + τXS
) α
1−α
[
nNN + nNS
(
1 + τXS
P˜S
) α
1−α
+ nSq
α
1−α
]
QN(1.4.2)
where ΛN = A
1/(1−α)
N
(
α
q
)1/(1−α)
and ΛS = A
1/(1−α)
S
(
α
q
)1/(1−α)
. The aggregate output in
each region is determined, in part, indirectly by the probabilities of innovation and imitation.
As with the profit equations, pI and pC are embedded within the effective human capital,
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the balanced trade determination of P˜S , and the distribution of firms.
The two aggregate resource constraints reflect that the final goods are used for domestic
consumption, R&D, or transformed into intermediate goods:
YN = CN +XNN +X∗NN +XNS +X
∗
NS + ZN
YS = CS +XS +X∗S + ZS
(1.4.3)
where XNN + X∗NN is the total intermediate output for Northern firms facing Northern
competition supplied to both the domestic and foreign markets. XNS + X∗NS is the total
intermediate supply from Northern firms facing Southern competition, and XS +X∗S is the
total supply of intermediate goods from Southern producers. Tariff revenues are used by
the government for no gain in utility or income for the individuals. Using the two resource
constraints, I summarize the expressions for ZN and ZS as (see the appendix for details)
ZN = YN − CN − (XNN +X∗NN +XNS +X∗NS) ≡ Z¯NQN (1.4.4)
and
ZS = YS − CS − (XS +X∗S) ≡ Z¯SQN (1.4.5)
where Z¯N and Z¯S are the quality adjusted expenditures on R&D.
The relative price of the Southern final good, P˜S , adjusts to balance trade at all times.
The trade balance equates the value of Northern intermediate good exports and the value
of intermediates produced in the South and exported to the North,
Value of
N. Exports
TB =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
P ∗NSnNSX
∗
NS + P
∗
NNnNNX
∗
NN − P ∗SnSX∗S︸ ︷︷ ︸ = 0.
Value of
S. Exports
(1.4.6)
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Equation (1.4.6) implicitly solves for the relative prices of the Southern final goods, P˜S . See
the appendix for additional details.
Relative Quality Level of the South
Using the definition of Qˆ = QS/QN , the relative average quality of the South evolves
according to
˙ˆ
Q
Qˆ
=
(
q
α
1−α − 1) (pC − pI) . (1.4.7)
In steady-state the evolution of the relative Southern quality level is constant. Therefore
the steady-state probability of innovation is exactly that of the probability of imitation, or,
pI = pC .
Distribution of Intermediate Firms
Consider, first, the fraction of industries characterized by Northern firms facing Northern
competition, nNN . The share of this type of firm will fall if a technology level is imitated, as
the production shifts to the South. The share of Northern firms facing Northern competition
increases with an innovation over a Northern firm previously facing Southern competition,
provided that technology is not imitated. These dynamics are captured in equation (1.4.8).
The share of Northern firms facing Southern competition increases through innovation in the
industries where production is currently in the South (nS), but will fall through imitation or
further innovation. This is detailed in equation (1.4.9). Finally, the share of firms located in
the South increases through imitation in any industry where production is currently in the
North (nNN + nNS) and falls with successful innovation, as captured in equation (1.4.10).
n˙NN = pI (1− pC)nNS − pCnNN (1.4.8)
n˙NS = pI (pCnNN + nS)− [(1− pI) pC + pI (1− pC)]nNS (1.4.9)
n˙S = (1− pI) pC (nNN + nNS)− pInS (1.4.10)
In steady-state, n˙NN = n˙NS = n˙S = 0. Solving the system of equations, the steady-state
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share of each type firm is
nNN =
p2I(1−pC)
(pI+pC−pIpC)2
nNS = pIpC(pI+pC−pIpC)2
nS =
pC(1−pI)
pI+pC−pIpC .
(1.4.11)
Using the steady-state result of the equalization of pI and pC , the steady-state shares of
each type of firm (setting p = pC = pI) is
nNN = 1−p(2−p)2
nNS = 1(2−p)2
nS = 1−p2−p .
(1.4.12)
A steady-state increase in the probability of innovation and imitation yields an increase in
the share of Northern firms facing Southern competition, or in other words, an increase in
global competition. Furthermore, the share of Northern firms facing Northern competition
and the share of firms located in the South both decrease.
Consumption and Technological Growth
From equations (1.3.26) and (1.3.27), the growth rates of consumption depend on the
country-specific interest rate and the evolution of the relative price of the Southern final
good, ˙˜PS , as determined by the balanced trade condition. To determine rN and rS , two
free-entry conditions imply that firms will devote resources to research until the expected
value of R&D success equals the R&D costs for the average industry. The Northern and
Southern free entry conditions, respectively are
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pIpiN
∫∞
t
e−
∫ s
t
[rN (v)+pC(v)+pI(v)]dvds = ZN
pCpiS
∫∞
t
e−
∫ s
t
[rS(v)+pI(v)]dvds = ZS
(1.4.13)
The expected value of innovation is the probability of R&D success times the average
profits discounted by the interest rate and the probability of rival innovation and Southern
imitation. The Southern profits are discounted only by the interest rate and the probability
Northern innovation. Differentiating both sides of the free entry conditions using Leibniz’s
rule yields the interest rates in both countries:
rN =
pIpiN
ZN
+
Z˙N
ZN
− p˙I
pI
− p˙iN
piN
− pC − pI (1.4.14)
rS =
pCpiS
ZS
+
Z˙S
ZS
− p˙C
pC
− p˙iS
piS
− pI (1.4.15)
The interest rates determine, in the long run, the rate of growth for output, consumption,
and research expenditures in both countries.
The final dynamic expressions represent the conditions for balance growth. Let χN ≡
CN/QN and χS ≡ CS/QN denote the quality adjusted consumption. In steady state,
the rate of consumption growth equals the growth rate of the frontier technology level, or
χ˙N
χN
= χ˙SχS = 0. The expressions for the North and South, respectively are
χ˙N
χN
=
1
θ
(rN − ρ)−
(
q
α
1−α − 1) pI (1.4.16)
χ˙S
χS
=
1
θ
(
rS −
˙˜PS
P˜S
− ρ
)
− (q α1−α − 1) pI . (1.4.17)
As a result, in steady-state the change in the relative price of the Southern final good,
˙˜P
P˜
,
is zero, thus, the diffusion of technology from the North to the South is sufficient to equalize
the interest rates in the North and South, or rN = rS in steady-state.
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1.4.2 Summary of Steady State
In steady state:
1. pC = pI based on equation (1.4.7).
2. The distribution of firm types are pinned down by equation (1.4.12).
3. The balanced trade condition pins down the relative price of the Southern final good,
P˜S by equation (1.4.6).
4. The resource constraints in the North and South pin down R&D outlays, ZN and ZS ,
by equations (1.4.4) and (1.4.5).
5. The interest rates in the North and South are determined by the free entry conditions.
6. The balanced growth condition for the south, equation (1.4.17), pins down the relative
technology level in the South, Qˆ.
7. The instantaneous probability of Northern innovation is pinned down by the balanced
growth condition in the North.
1.4.3 Transitional Dynamics
The dynamic system of five equations and five unknowns consist of the evolution of Qˆ,
defined by equation (1.4.7); two firm entry and exit conditions, defined by equations (1.4.9)
and (1.4.10); and the consumption growth conditions in the North and South, defined by
equations (1.4.16) and (1.4.17) respectively. Using initial conditions for Qˆ, nNS , and nS , the
transitional dynamics of wage inequality in the North and South are fully characterized. The
transition path is solved by log-linearizing the system of equations around the steady-state
and using the reverse shooting methodology.
The model is solved using numerical simulation for reasonable parameter values. Pa-
rameter values are based on theoretical and empirical priors, and chosen such that they
yield saddle path stability. In addition, I select parameters such that in steady state and
at all points during the transition that 0 < pI < 1, 1+τXSq < P˜S < 1, and 0 < Qˆ < 1.
32
Parameter Values
θ = 3.0 Inverse of constant elasticity of sub.
ρ = 0.02 Subjective discount rate
α = 0.3 Capital share in final goods production
σ = 8.5 Elasticity of pC w.r.t. Qˆ
AN = 2.25 Northern final goods productivity
AS = 1.75 Southern final goods productivity
φI = 0.15 Northern innovation productivity
φC = 0.075 Southern imitation productivity
q = 1.5 Constant size of quality improvements
LS = 2.0 Relative size of the South
Table 1.2: Qualitative results are robust to small changes in the quality of education pa-
rameters.
Other parameter selections potentially lead to non-existent steady-states, or globally di-
vergent transitional paths. The parameters are restricted as to yield saddle paths with
all real eigenvectors and three negative eigenvalues in the transitional matrix. See Eicher
and Turnovsky (2001) and Connolly and Valderrama (2007) for details. The benchmark
parameter values are listed in Table 1.2.
The parameter values for the trade barriers, τXS and τXN , and quality of education, δm
are discussed in the next section.
1.5 Southern Trade Liberalization
Assume the global economy is in a steady-state in which there are positive tariffs on
Southern intermediate imports, τXS . For simplicity, I set τXN = 0.13 Trade liberalization
removes the barriers to trade, specifically τXS drops from τXS = 0.35⇒ 0.0.14
I differentiate between two cases based on the quality of education in the South. In the
first case I assume a low value for quality of education parameter δlowS , and in the second
13Northern trade liberalization and bilateral trade liberalization experiments are possible, however, I focus
here on Southern trade liberalization.
14Trade liberalization of a lesser magnitude induces the same qualitative results.
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Quality of Education Parameters
North South (Case 1) South (Case 2)
δ 19.5 5 10.5
Table 1.3: Denotes quality of education parameters. Qualitative results are robust to small
changes in the quality of education parameters. The change in the quality of education in
the South is the only difference between Case 1 and Case 2.
case the South has a higher quality of education, δhighS . In both cases I assume the North
has a higher quality of education, and it follows that δN ≥ δhighS > δlowS . The quality of
education in the South is the only difference between case one and case two. Table 1.3
summarizes the quality of education parameters. The quality of education in the South is
the only difference between the two cases.
1.5.1 Steady State Implications
The long run implications of Southern trade liberalization do not significantly change
based on the quality of education in the South. In steady state, Southern trade liberalization
unambiguously increases the incentives to innovate in the North. The average profits of
Northern intermediate firms are decreasing in the level of the Southern tariff. Intuitively,
the effective marginal cost of a Northern firm exporting to the Southern market falls when
the tariff rate is reduced, which increases the returns to successful innovation.
The faster long run rate of technological progress increases within country inequality in
both the North and the South, increases the total per capita income for Southern workers
relative to Northern workers, and also increases (to a lesser amount) the total relative income
of the South when also considering the profitability of Northern and Southern intermediate
firm profits. As mentioned above, profits for Northern firms rise which also increases the
total fraction of firms located in the North. In addition, profits for Southern firms fall as does
the fraction of firms located in the South. Intuitively, lower trade barriers imply Southern
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Steady State Results
Case 1: Low Quality Case 2: High Quality
Variable Original SS Final SS Change Original SS Final SS Change
pI = pC 0.00641 0.01013 58.03 0.006374 0.010045 57.6
Qˆ 0.935 0.856 -8.45 0.936 0.859 -8.23
HN 1.00378 1.01135 0.75 1.00372 1.01115 0.74
HS/LS 0.99730 0.99617 -0.11 0.99893 1.00005 0.11
a∗N 0.88825 0.83379 -6.13 0.88886 0.83491 -6.07
a∗S 0.96878 0.95144 -1.79 0.93693 0.90381 -3.53
Ωs/uN 1.06596 1.1044 3.61 1.06556 1.10357 3.57
Ωs/uS 1.0193 1.03054 1.10 1.03677 1.05808 2.06
ΩN/S1 1.64440 1.53599 -6.59 1.64257 1.53190 -6.74
ΩN/S2 1.67205 1.64945 -1.35 1.66928 1.64274 -1.59
Table 1.4: See text for parameters used before and after Southern trade liberalization.
firms must charge a low price to ensure all Northern firms are priced out of the market.
Table 1.4 details the steady state implication of Southern trade liberalization using the
parameters above.
Southern trade liberalization significantly increases the rate of technological progress in
both cases. When the South has a high quality of education, within country inequality
increases by a slightly larger percent in the long run, and using both measurements of across
country inequality, a higher quality of education leads to greater convergence. There is
a greater amount of additional workers who choose to become skilled when the quality of
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education is high. Finally, when the quality of education is low, trade liberalization decreases
the overall effective human capital in the South, but when the quality of education is high,
trade liberalization increases overall effective human capital.
1.5.2 Dynamic Transition
The quality of education in the South does not greatly change the long implications for
inequality following trade liberalization. However, the transitional dynamics depend on the
quality of education to a much larger extent. I begin, first, by discussing the dynamics of
the instantaneous probabilities of innovation and imitation, and then shift my focus to the
dynamics of within and across country inequality. The dynamics of all variables are found
in the appendix.
Probabilities of Innovation and Imitation
Figure 1.5 documents the evolution of the rates of innovation and imitation in the tran-
sition from the initial steady state with barriers to trade to the open steady-state as the
percentage deviation from the initial steady state.
Beginning with the immediate effects, trade liberalization reduces the price of inter-
mediate goods for the Southern final goods market in two ways, P ∗NN = q (1 + τXS) and
PS = 1 + τXS , thus increasing the demand from the South. Overall, average profits of inter-
mediate good firms in the North increase, which leads to an increase the resources allocated
for innovation. The fall in P ∗NN increases the demand for exports from Northern firms facing
Northern competition, X∗NN , which decreases the relative price of the Southern final good,
P˜S . The fall in P˜S increases YN by equation (1.4.1), decreases p¯iN and decreases X∗NN . The
net total initial effect is an immediate jump in ZN , and thereby, an increase in pI . In the
South, trade liberalization reduces average profits for successful imitators, and through the
balance trade condition, reduces aggregate output, YS by equation (1.4.2). The net initial
effect is a small drop in the probability of imitation pC . These initial jumps hold in both
the case when the quality of education is high and when the quality of education is low.
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Figure 1.5: Denotes the transitional dynamics of the instantaneous rates of innovation and
imitation following Southern trade liberalization. Given as the percentage change from the
initial steady state.
The initial increase in the rate of innovation (pI) and decrease in the rate of imitation (pC)
also have implications for the effective human capital in both regions. The effective human
capital increases in the North, and decreases in the South when the quality of education
in the South is low, which, by equation (1.4.4), increases Northern aggregate output, and
decreases in Southern output which further increases the resources allocated to innovation
in the North. This leads to a larger initial gap between pI and pC when the quality of
education in the South is low.
The initial jump in pI introduces a dynamic feedback loop. When the quality of education
in the South is low, HS falls, which lessens their ability to successful imitate. Lower rates of
imitation extend the duration of Northern firms earning profits, which continues to increase
their incentives to innovate. The effective human capital in the North continues to rise,
further increasing effective human capital in the North, while the effective human capital
in the South continues to fall, further decreasing their ability to imitate. The complete
transitional path, however, is non-monotonic. Since pI is greater than pC in the transition,
Qˆ decreases. As Qˆ falls, successful imitation becomes easier by equation 1.3.20, and the rate
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Figure 1.6: Denotes the transitional dynamics of income inequality within the South follow-
ing Southern trade liberalization. Given as the percentage change from the initial steady
state.
of imitation begins to converge to the rate of innovation. As a result pI begins to fall as the
transitional path approaches the new long run steady state.
A very different feedback loop emerges when the quality of education in the South is high.
The initial jump in pI increases the effective human capital in the South when their quality
of education is high. This increases their ability to imitate, which decreases the incentives
for Northern firms to innovate following the initial jump following trade liberalization. The
fall in pI during the first part of the transition along with the growth in pC makes imitation
increasingly difficult. Thus, pC increases by a smaller and smaller amount, which then
reverses the downward movement of pI . During the last part of the transition, both pI and
pC converge to a higher steady state.
Southern Within Country Inequality
Figure 1.6 documents Southern income inequality within countries for case 1 (low quality
of education) and case 2 (high quality of education). The two diagrams are in scale as
percentage deviation from the initial steady state.
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The dynamics of within country inequality follow the same nonmonotonic transition path
as the instantaneous probability of innovation. As mentioned above, the steady state growth
of inequality is higher when the quality of education is high. This conceals, however, the
important differences during the transition. During the transition, the growth of inequality
is higher when the quality of education is low. In addition, after an initial jump, inequality
is declining during the first part of the transition when the quality of education is high,
whereas, inequality continues to increase when the quality of education is low.
Inequality Across Countries
In the model I characterize income inequality in two ways, the first considers only the
relative per capita income of workers, while the second takes into account the total profits of
firms. Using either measurement Southern trade liberalization decreases long run inequality
across country. Figure 1.7 shows the percentage change of the per capita income of Northern
workers relative to Southern workers, and Figure 1.8 includes firm profits. A decline in
either measurement indicates convergence by the South (relative income of Northern workers
decline).
Focusing first on Figure 1.7, income inequality across countries falls immediately follow-
ing Southern trade liberalization. In the first part of the transition inequality rises, before
falling to a lower long run steady state. This holds true for when the quality of education
in the South is low or high. In the long run, inequality falls by a slightly greater amount
when the quality of education is low. However, the differences in the transition are equally
important. The divergence during the first part of the transition is stronger when the quality
of education is low compared to the case when the quality of education is high.
This become more clear when looking at Figure 1.8 where firm profits are included. Over-
all, inequality across countries decreases by a smaller amount. This is driven by an increase
in the number of firms in the North and their increased profitability due to trade liberal-
ization. Using this measurement, inequality across countries decreases by a larger amount
when the quality of education in the South is high. Moreover, the decline in inequality is
monotonic. When the quality of education in the South is low, inequality increases in the
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Figure 1.7: Denotes the transitional dynamics of income inequality across countries following
Southern trade liberalization, captured of the total income per worker in the North relative
to that in the South. Given as the percentage change from the initial steady state.
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Figure 1.8: Denotes the transitional dynamics of income inequality across countries following
Southern trade liberalization, captured of the total income per worker plus total firm profits
in the North relative to that in the South. Given as the percentage change from the initial
steady state.
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initial periods of the transition following the immediate impact of trade liberalization.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper emphasizes how the dynamics of income inequality, both within and across
countries, are dependent on the interaction between the rate of new technologies entering
the production process and the quality of education embedded within the effective human
capital. This paper links the two types of inequality within a general equilibrium model
of North-South trade and endogenous innovation and imitation, in which agents make the
endogenous discrete choice of educational attainment. The quality of education increases the
ability of workers (who acquired education) to adapt and learn new technologies. Following
Southern trade liberalization, the ability to adapt to faster rates of technological progress
has implications for the long run, but more importantly, the short run, dynamics of within
and across country income inequality.
In the long run, Southern trade liberalization increases the rate of technological progress,
which increases inequality within both the North and the South. In the transition, how-
ever, income inequality in the South will increase by a greater percentage when the quality
of education is low. In terms of inequality across countries, the total per capita income
of Southern workers and firm profits increase relative to the North. This suggests South-
ern trade liberalization decreases long run inequality across countries. This convergence is
stronger when the quality of education in the South is high. When the quality of education
is low, there are periods of divergence during the dynamic transition that does not appear
when the quality of education is high. The key contribution of this paper is introducing a
source of heterogeneity among developing countries that accounts for a wide array of income
inequality dynamics.
Broadly speaking, the results provide some intuition as to why, following trade liberal-
ization, developing countries in Latin America and Africa, with a relatively low quality of
education have experienced a higher growth of within country income inequality and notably
less convergence compared to East Asian economies. In the next chapter, I will provide em-
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pirical support for the relationship between within country inequality, technological change
and the quality of education. Specifically, he finds a higher quality of education directly
reduces the growth of inequality and indirectly by reducing the marginal impact of faster
rates of technological progress. This empirical evidence lends support that emphasize the
critical role of education and technological change in determining the dynamics of income
inequality.
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2. The Diffusion of Technology, Education and Income Inequality: Evidence
from Developed and Developing Countries
2.1 Introduction
In recent decades, rapid technological progress has coincided with fundamental changes
to the dynamics of income inequality in countries across the development spectrum. The
growth of inequality accelerated substantially within developed countries and most devel-
oping countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Across developing and emerging economies,
the growth in inequality was more severe in Latin America and Africa compared to many
East Asian countries.1 This paper uses a broad spectrum of developed and developing coun-
tries to investigate the factors underlying the recent dynamics of income inequality. This
empirical analysis shows that the diffusion of new technologies contributed significantly to
the growth of inequality. In addition, this paper also shows that the quality of education
directly lowers the growth of inequality, but also significantly reduces the impact of new
technologies on inequality. The quality of education emerges as an important determinant
as to why the dynamics of inequality differed among developing countries.
Since Kuznets’ (1955) seminal work, the relationship between inequality and techno-
logical progress has been widely researched and documented. The recent rise in income
inequality is largely attributed to Skill Biased Technological Change (SBTC).2 Nelson and
Phelps (1966), for example, contend that during periods of rapid technological change,
skilled workers are quicker to obtain the additional knowledge required to adapt to new
technologies, which in turn, increases the skill premium.3 Other theories such as capital-
skill complementary (Greenwood et al., 1997; Krusell et al., 2000) or directed technological
change (Acemoglu, 1998; 2002) have been proposed that link technological change to income
1The measure for inequality is the Theil index from the University of Texas Inequality Project (available
at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html).
2For surveys see Acemoglu (2002) and Aghion (2002), among others.
3Also see Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000) and Aghion (2002)
for similar arguments.
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inequality. The empirical evidence is mixed at best. Bound and Johnson (1992), Juhn, Mur-
phy and Pierce (1993), Levy and Murnane (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Katz (1999)
and others find a positive link between technological progress and inequality in the U.S.,
while Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) find evidence SBTC throughout other developed
countries. Card and DiNardo (2002), on-the-other-hand, review the literature and conclude
that technology only plays a small role in the growth of inequality. Much of the empirical
literature, however, has dealt with SBTC largely within only OECD countries (Autor and
Katz, 1999). This paper extends the literature to consider the links between new technolo-
gies, education and the dynamics of inequality for a broader spectrum of developed and
developing countries.
The main contribution of this paper consists of linking how the dynamics of inequality
respond to the interaction of technological change with both the quantity and quality of
education. I capture the diffusion of new technologies by utilizing a theoretically consistent
gravity model to estimate the high skill factor content of imports. Using the Theil index
(UTIP-UNIDO, 2002) to measure income inequality, I find that a higher skilled factor con-
tent of imports significantly increase the growth of inequality, but the magnitude of this
effect is smaller when the quality of education is high. In addition, the interaction between
technological change and the quantity of education is insignificant. This suggests that dur-
ing periods of accelerated technological progress, a higher quality of education (rather than
a higher quantity of education) lessens the impact of new technologies on the growth of
inequality.
This paper is the first to consider the impact of the quality of education on the dynamics
of inequality. De Gregorio and Lee (2002) use a sample of developed and developing countries
and find the level of inequality to be negatively related to both the average years of education
and a more equitable distribution of education. However, one year of education may differ
dramatically in terms of quality across countries. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) develop
quality of education measures using internationally comparable math and science test scores
to capture the large dispersion of the quality of education throughout the world. This paper
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demonstrates that the quality of education is important factor that lessens the effect of new
technologies on the growth of inequality. A labor force with a higher quality of education
is quicker to adapt to new technologies. This intuition is consistent with the Nelson and
Phelps theory where the ability to learn new technologies is the link between technological
change and growing income inequality.
To estimate the change in the arrival rate new technologies for a broad range of economies,
this paper isolates the high skill component of imports.4 Intuitively, during periods of trade
liberalization a higher skill content embodied within imports leads to a faster change in the
arrival rate of new technologies. This measure is advantageous for several reasons. First,
it provides a measure of technological change for over 100 countries across the development
spectrum. Second, most countries engaged in widespread trade liberalization during the
1980s and 1990s, and evidence suggests that imports are a significant channel of technological
diffusion (Keller, 2004).5 New communication and information technologies diffused not only
throughout the industrialized countries, but also to developing countries as well, largely
through imports.6
The median growth of inequality during the 1980s was positive in Latin America, Africa,
Asia, the Middle East/North Africa, and advanced countries. The magnitude of this growth
was most severe in Latin America and Africa, and the lowest in Asia. I find the interaction
between technological change and the quality of education to be fundamental in explaining
the variations in the observed dynamics of income inequality in developing countries. The
results show that the predicted growth of inequality to be 39 percent in Latin America
between 1980 and 1990 compared to just 16 percent in Asia. This is driven by a substantially
4Other measures for technological change have included computer use (Krueger, 1993; Reilly, 1995; Card,
Kramarz and Lemieux, 1999; Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; Riley and Young, 1999; Haskel and Heden,
1999; Desjonqueres, Machin and van Reenen, 1999), capital intensities (Krusell et al., 2000; Goldin and Katz,
1998), investment in research and development (R&D) (Tan and Batra, 1997), and R&D intensity (Dickens
and Katz, 1987; Machin and van Reenen, 1998), among others. These measurements for technological
change, in general, show a positive link between technology and inequality, however limited international
data confines studies to the U.S. and other developed countries.
5For example, employing foreign intermediate goods involves the implicit knowledge of using the technol-
ogy embedded within imports. In addition, the diffusion of technology raises the productivity of the research
in the recipient country, which implies an international research spillover.
6Consistent with the notion of major technological change in reference to General Purpose Technologies
(See Helpman, 1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Galor and Moav, 2000; and
Aghion, 2002).
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higher quality of education, on average, in Asia. Given that the average years (quantity) of
education was actually higher in Latin America relative to Asia in 1980, it is the quality,
not quantity, of education that potentially explains the diverse patterns of inequality among
developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents a theoretical
model to motivate the empirical specification; Section 2.3 details the data, including the
measurement of the skilled factor content of trade; Section 2.4 presents the empirical results;
and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Quality of Education and Technological Progress
2.2.1 Model Setup
Skill biased technological change is modeled in many ways. This paper makes straight-
forward extensions to the formulation of SBTC in Bound and Johnson (1992), Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998), and Card and DiNardo (2002). This class of models allows for hetero-
geneous productivities among different skill groups. This paper, in line with the ideas of
Nelson and Phelps (1966), Galor and Moav (2000) and Aghion (2002), modifies the set up
to allow for the arrival rate of new technologies to affect not only the relative demand for
high skill workers, but also the effective efficiency units of labor supply.
Consider a simple CES production function with two factors of production: high skill
(h) and low skill (l) workers,
Y = A [(ghNh)
ρ + (glNl)
ρ]1/ρ , (2.2.1)
where Nh and Nl are the aggregate efficiency units of high and low skill workers, gh and gl
denote the productivities of high and low skill workers, and A is a skill neutral technology
parameter. The elasticity of substitution between high and low skill workers is σ = 11−ρ .
7
7Johnson (1997) suggests the elasticity of substitution lies somewhere between 1 and 2, with a best guess
to be in the neighborhood of 1.4 - 1.5. This implies ρ to be around 0.3. Also see Katz and Murphy (1992),
Krusell et al. (2000), and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998).
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2.2.2 Labor Demand
Using equation (2.2.1), the inverse demand functions for efficiency units of high and low
skill workers are given by
wh = w¯g
ρ
hN
ρ−1
h
wl = w¯g
ρ
l N
ρ−1
l ,
(2.2.2)
where w¯ = A [(ghNh)
ρ + (glNl)
ρ]1/ρ−1, and wh and wl denote the wages for high and low
skill workers respectively.
The ratio of marginal products of the two types of labor presents a measure of income
inequality as a function of relative productivity, relative efficiency units of labor and the
elasticity of substitution. The relative wage is given by
wh
wl
=
(
gh
gl
)ρ(
Nh
Nl
)−(1−ρ)
. (2.2.3)
An increase in the relative productivity of high skill workers increases the relative wage,
while an increase in the relative supply of skilled efficiency units decreases the relative wage.
Skill biased technological change involves an increase in the relative productivity of the
high skill workers, ghgl . There are, however, many methods to modeling SBTC. One line of
reasoning considers capital and skills to be compliments. In this case innovations that reduce
the cost of capital, in turn, increase the relative productivity of skilled workers. Goldin
and Katz (1998) and others find evidence that skills and capital are indeed compliments.
Acemoglu (1998, 2002) argues that it is not only the speed of innovations, but also the
direction of technological change. This theory suggests the expansion of educated labor
during the postwar period caused new technologies to be more directed toward educated
workers. This effect, again, changes the relative productivity and relative demand for high
skill workers.
This paper introduces SBTC in line with the Nelson-Phelps view of human capital. Dur-
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ing periods of rapid technological diffusion, the relative demand for skilled workers increases
reflecting their advantage of adapting to new technologies. Galor and Moav (2000) presents
a model in which the rate of technological progress determines the relative demand for high
skill workers. In line with Galor and Moav, equation (2.2.3) is modified such that the relative
demand for high skill workers is driven by the arrival rate of new technologies. Let 0 < a¯ < 1
denote the exogenous rate of the diffusion of new technologies. A simple formulation is
gh
gl
= f (a¯) = 1 + a¯
where the function f is increasing in the arrival rate of new technologies, or f ′ (a¯) > 0,
reflecting greater demand for high skill workers during periods of faster technological diffu-
sion. Rewriting (2.2.3) with this substitution yields a function for the relative demand for
skilled workers,
wh
wl
= (1 + a¯)ρ
(
Nh
Nl
)−(1−ρ)
. (2.2.4)
An increase in the arrival rate of new technologies leads to an increase in the relative wages
of high skill workers (holding constant the supplies of efficiency units of labor), which reflects
their advantage of learning new technologies.
2.2.3 Labor Supply
The arrival rate of new technologies can also have an impact on the efficiency units of
labor supply. For a given arrival rate of new technologies, a¯, a worker must spend a certain
portion of their time learning and adapting to the new technologies, away from wage earning
production. If new technologies begin arriving at a faster rate, that same worker must take
more time in the process of learning the technologies. This effect reduces the efficiency units
of labor supplied to production. This component of the model reflects empirical evidence
from Bartel and Sicherman (1998), who show that an increase in the rate of technological
progress increases the need to (re)train workers, especially low skill workers. Allowing the
rate of technological progress to alter the effective labor supply also introduces the important
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role of educational factors. All else equal, a worker with more years of education or a better
quality of education is able to learn the new technologies at a faster rate.
Let β > 1 represent the quality of education and T > 1 denote the baseline quantity of
education received by all workers. Skilled workers are assumed to have a relative advantage
at adapting to, or learning, new technologies, captured by the exogenous parameter x > 0.
The efficiency units of high and low skill workers are given by
Nh = nh
(
1− a¯
βT (1 + x)
)
(2.2.5)
Nl = nl
(
1− a¯
βT
)
, (2.2.6)
where nh and nl are the numbers of each type of worker, and the term in the parenthesis
(between 0 and 1) captures the notion that efficiency units of supply depreciate based on
the arrival rate of new technologies. All else equal, an increase in a¯ increases the time spent
in learning new technologies, rather than in production. A higher quality of education β,
or a higher quantity of education, T , reduce this learning cost. Finally, the inclusion of x
implies that high skill workers are better able to adapt to new technologies. Galor and Moav
(2000) allow for an increase in the rate of technological progress to generate an endogenous
substitution toward more high skill workers. Although this would be a straightforward
extension, the purposes of this illustration do not require mobility between skill groups.
2.2.4 Implications for Income Inequality
Substituting equations (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) into (2.2.2) yields the competitive wage per
efficiency unit of labor as:
wh = w¯g
ρ
h
[
nh
(
1− a¯βT (1+x)
)]ρ−1
wl = w¯g
ρ
l
[
nl
(
1− a¯βT
)]ρ−1
,
(2.2.7)
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where w¯ = A [(ghNh)
ρ + (glNl)
ρ]1/ρ−1.
Income is the wage multiplied by the efficiency units of labor supply. For instance,
a given high skill worker earns the wage wh as given by equation (2.2.7) multiplied by
their individual supply to production. The supply of labor for a high skill worker is the
aggregate efficiency units of skilled labor, Nh, divided by the number of skilled workers, nh,
or Nhnh =
(
1− a¯βT (1+x)
)
. Likewise, a low skill worker earns wl multiplied by their production
supply, Nlnl =
(
1− a¯βT
)
. The incomes for high and low skill workers are,
Ih = wh Nhnh = w¯g
ρ
h
[
nh
(
1− a¯βT (1+x)
)]ρ−1 (
1− a¯βT (1+x)
)
Il = wl Nlnl = w¯g
ρ
l
[
nl
(
1− a¯βT
)]ρ−1 (
1− a¯βT
)
.
(2.2.8)
Inequality, Ω, is given by the relative income of a high skill worker, or Ih/Il:
Ω ≡ Ih
Il
= (1 + a¯)ρ
(
nh
nl
)ρ−1(
βT (1 + x)− a¯
(βT − a¯) (1 + x)
)ρ
. (2.2.9)
Equation (2.2.9) shows inequality to be shaped by three different forces. The first two are
straightforward. The first term in parentheses reflects the skill biased nature of technological
change. In this case, faster arrival rates of new technologies increase the relative demand
for skilled workers who are better able to learn and adapt to the new technologies. The
second term is the number of high skill workers relative to low skill workers. All else equal,
an increase in the relative number of skilled workers will decrease income inequality.
The final term in equation (2.2.9) reflects how the interaction between the arrival rate of
new technologies and educational factors play a role in the effective efficiency of high and low
skill workers. An increase in the arrival rate of new technologies, a¯, (all else equal) decreases
the efficiency units of both types of labor. Moreover, this effect is relatively more substantial
for low skill individuals. As a result, an increase in the arrival rate of new technologies not
only increases inequality by raising the relative demand for high skill workers, but also
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increases the efficiency of high skill labor relative low skill labor. To illustrate, consider that
∂
(
βT (1+x)−a¯
(βT−a¯)(1+x)
)ρ
∂a¯
= ρ
(
βT (1 + x)− a¯
(βT − a¯) (1 + x)
)ρ−1(
xβT
(1 + x) (βT − a¯)2
)
> 0. (2.2.10)
The third term in parentheses also includes both the quality of education and the differ-
ence in the schooling of high skill workers relative to low skill workers. The marginal impact
of increases in educational quality and quantity, respectively, are given by
∂
(
βT (1+x)−a¯
(βT−a¯)(1+x)
)ρ
∂β
= −ρ
(
βT (1 + x)− a¯
(βT − a¯) (1 + x)
)ρ−1(
a¯xT
(1 + x) (βT − a¯)2
)
< 0, (2.2.11)
and
∂
(
βT (1+x)−a¯
(βT−a¯)(1+x)
)ρ
∂T
= −ρ
(
βT (1 + x)− a¯
(βT − a¯) (1 + x)
)ρ−1(
a¯xβ
(1 + x) (βT − a¯)2
)
< 0. (2.2.12)
When the quality or quantity of education is high, all workers are better able to quickly
learn new technologies, which narrows the efficiency gap.
Furthermore, this model also shows the role of education during periods of faster diffusion
of new technologies, or when a¯ is increased. Consider two countries that differ only in their
educational characteristics. An increase in the arrival rate of new technologies increases
inequality more in the country with a lower quality or quantity of education. Stated another
way, a better quality or quantity of education reduce the impact of the arrival rate of new
technologies on income inequality. The cross derivatives can be calculated to show this
effect:
∂
[(
βT (1+x)−a¯
(βT−a¯)(1+x)
)ρ]2
∂a¯∂β
< 0 and
∂
[(
βT (1+x)−a¯
(βT−a¯)(1+x)
)ρ]2
∂a¯∂T
< 0 (2.2.13)
Finally, the cross derivative of the third term with respect to the quality and quantity
of education is positive. This implies, for example, that improving the quality of education
reduces inequality more when the quantity of education is low. The quality of education
is then of particular importance for developing countries with a lower overall quantity of
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education. It can be shown that:
∂
[(
βT (1+x)−a¯
(βT−a¯)(1+x)
)ρ]2
∂β∂T
> 0 (2.2.14)
In sum, an increase in the arrival rate of new technologies unambiguously increases
income inequality. However, if a country has a higher quality of education, β, or quantity
of education, T , the change in inequality will be less.
2.2.5 Empirical Specification
The log of (2.2.9) is
log [Ω] = ρ log [1 + a¯]− (1− ρ) log
[
nh
nl
]
+ ρ log
[
βT (1 + x)− a¯
(βT − a¯) (1 + x)
]
(2.2.15)
and the first difference over time of (2.2.15) leads to an expression that describes the evolu-
tion of income inequality modified to incorporate the role technological change plays in the
effective efficiency of labor supply:
∆ log [Ω] = ρ∆ log [1 + a¯]− (1− ρ) ∆ log
[
nh
nl
]
+ ρ∆ log
[
βT (1 + x)− a¯
(βT − a¯) (1 + x)
]
. (2.2.16)
The empirical analysis uses data from a broad spectrum of countries to test the fundamental
predictions contained in (2.2.16). Specifically, the log change in income inequality is a
function of 1) the log change in the arrival rate of new technologies; 2) the log change in
relative stock of high skill workers; 3) the quality of education; 4) the relative advantage in
schooling or training of high skill workers; and 5) the interactions among the log change in
the arrival rate of new technologies and the quality and quantity of education. The critical
expected results are based on the marginal effects shown in (2.2.10), (2.2.13) and (2.2.14).
Consider the following reduced form empirical representation of (2.2.16)8:
8See appendix for an alternative specification.
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∆ log [Ω]t,0 = α+ β1∆ log [a¯] + β2∆ log
[
nh
nl
]
t,0
+β3 log [QL] + β4 log [T ] + β5 log [QL] ∆ log [a¯]
+β6 log [T ] ∆ log [a¯] + β7 log [QL] log [T ] +X ′βX + ,
(2.2.17)
where ∆ log [Ω]t,0 is the log change in inequality between the initial year 0 and year t, ∆ log [a¯]
is the log change in the arrival rate of new technologies, ∆ log
[
nh
nl
]
t,0
is the log change in
the relative number of workers considered “skilled,” log [QL] is the log of the quality of
education, and log [T ] is the log of the average years of education. Finally, X ′ captures
other exogenous variables and  is the error term. Clearly there is potential endogeneity
between the dynamics of inequality and the change in the arrival rate of new technologies,
and this issue is addressed specifically in the next section.
This empirical analysis captures the total effect of changes in the arrival rate of tech-
nologies on the dynamics of income inequality. The expectations on the coefficients linked
to ∆ log [a¯] are β1 > 0, β5 < 0 and β6 < 0. Or, the total effect of changes in the ar-
rival rate of new technologies on the growth of inequality is a function of the educational
factors: (β1 + β5 log [QL] + β6 log [T ]). The growth of inequality following an increase in
technological diffusion differs across countries based, largely, on educational characteristics.
2.3 Data Measurement
2.3.1 Inequality
The measurement for income inequality is the Theil index (UTIP-UNIDO, 2002) which
includes a large set developed and developing countries over an extended time frame. The
Theil index is advantageous because it measures industrial wage inequality in the manufac-
turing sector, with data taken from the Industrial Statistics database published annually
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by the United Nations Development Organization. Another commonly used measure of in-
equality is the Gini coefficient (Deininger and Squire, 1996; 1998). However, this measures
the concentration of income based on household surveys (See Deininger and Squire, 1996).
Conceicao and Galbraith (2000) and others also find this measure to be incomplete in terms
of country coverage over time and largely inconsistent with other measures of inequality.
The Theil index (UTIP-UNIDO, 2002) provides a more complete measure of inequality over
countries and over time and is closer in line with the analysis above. Atkinson (1997) shows
that earnings and wage inequality are the main components of the larger distribution of
income.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the median of the log change of the Theil index for five country
cohorts: advanced countries, Middle Eastern and North African countries, Latin American
countries, Sub-Saharan African countries and Asian countries. The data spans from 1960
until 1995 and is broken up into six ten-year periods.
The dynamics of inequality clearly changed after 1980 for each of the groups of countries.
The median growth of inequality was negative or zero for each of the five groups of countries
between 1965 and 1975, as well as from 1970 to 1980. However, the growth of inequality
accelerated substantially during the 1980s. The median log change of inequality for each of
the five groups was positive from 1980-1990, and furthermore, the log change from 1980-1990
was greater than the change from 1970-1980 and 1975-1985. In addition, for all except the
advanced countries, the median change in inequality was less from 1985-1995 than from 1980-
1990. This suggests the pace of the global growth of inequality has slowed since peaking
from 1980-1990. The relative magnitude of the growth of inequality in the 1980s is also
important. Inequality grew substantially more in Latin America and Africa relative to the
other three cohorts, while the growth of inequality was lowest in the Asian countries for the
periods 1980-1990 and 1985-1995.
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2.3.2 Educational Factors
Measuring the quality of education is inherently difficult. Standard measures for the
quality of education, including adult literacy rates, teacher-pupil ratios, teacher salaries or
expenditures per student, are typically insignificant in cross-country growth studies, and
are notoriously poor measures for the quality of education in the labor force. In addition,
measures of the quantity of formal schooling, typically taken from the Barro-Lee datasets,
do not fully capture the cognitive ability of the labor force since there is a lack of adjustment
for the quality of the education. One year of education in the U.S. is not equivalent to one
year of schooling in most developing countries. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) address this
issue by developing measures for the quality of the labor force derived from a number of
international mathematics and science tests between the years 1965 through 1991.9 While
test score data is available for only 39 countries, Hanushek and Kimko use consistent estima-
tors to forecast labor force quality for a large number of countries based on country specific
characteristics.10 Table A.1 in the appendix details this quality of education measurement
for countries according to their region (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000).
Using the Hanushek and Kimko measure, the poorest quality of the labor force education
is 18.26 (Iran), while the highest is 72.13 (Singapore). The mean for the entire sample of 88
countries is 45.32 with a standard deviation of 13.15. Advanced countries had the highest
average for the quality of education (56.04), followed by Asia (49.57), Latin America (40.22),
Sub-Saharan Africa (39.20), and the Middle East/North Africa (32.70). Overall, the data
supports the idea that the quality of education varies significantly and systematically across
countries and regions.
Data for the proportion of the labor force considered to be high skilled is taken from the
Barro-Lee dataset for persons aged 15 years and higher (Barro and Lee, 2000). The fraction
nh
nl
is the stock of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. If L is the total labor
9International math and science tests were conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation
of Educational Achievement and the International Assessment of Educational Progress.
10Hanushek and Kimko produce two quality measures for countries across the development spectrum. The
first measure converts the test scores to a mean of 50. This, however, assumes that the world performance
in math and science in constant over time. The second measure (the measure used in this paper) relaxes this
assumption, and allows for the global mean to drift based on the performance of U.S. students over time.
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force divided into two skill cohorts, then the fraction can be rewritten as nhL−nh . Dividing
through by L yields nhnl =
nh/L
1−nh/L . The term nh/L is then measured as the fraction of
higher school attained in the total work force.11 The empirical analysis also incorporates
the initial quantity of education, again, from the Barro-Lee dataset. The average years
of education allows for a direct comparison of the relative importance between the quality
and the quantity of education in driving the dynamics of income inequality. Barro and Lee
(2000) show very little direct correlation between the average years of education and the
quality of education.
2.3.3 Arrival Rate of New Technologies
The final variable of interest is the change in the arrival rate of new technologies. It
is important to note that the change in the arrival rate of new technologies is different
than changes in the rate of technological progress or changes in overall economic growth.
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) document historically that an increase in the arrival rate of
new technologies (ie. new communication and information technologies) leads to a temporary
slowdown of productivity or economic growth. One of the main contributions of this paper
is capturing the extent of the diffusion of new technologies through trade.
Quantifying the pace of technological diffusion is problematic. One widely cited source
of technological diffusion is the development and usage of personal computers and the inter-
net, dating back to the introduction of IBM-PC in 1981. Krueger (1993) uses the fraction
of workers who use a computer on the job as a measure for the pace of technological change.
Jorgenson (2001) uses the relative size of the information technology sector in the over-
all economy. Card and DiNardo (2002) offer a critical assessment of these measures of
technological progress. For example, they cite evidence that the growth of inequality in
the U.S. slowed during the 1990s despite continued improvement and usage of computer
technologies. R&D expenditures and computer purchases are other measures to capture
technological change utilized by Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994). Berman, Bound,
11The fraction of those with at least some secondary education is also used to approximate the percentage
of skilled workers in the labor force.
56
and Machin (1998), on the other hand, find the spread of microprocessor technologies to
have led to both skill upgrading and rising inequality, especially in industries most depen-
dent on computer technologies. Moreover, they find this trend to be pervasive throughout
the developed world. However, their analysis is confined only to the twelve richest countries
in 1985 due to industry specific data restrictions.
This paper takes a different approach to quantifying the change in the arrival rate of
new technologies, which significantly increases the number of countries included. The ar-
rival rate of new technologies accelerated during the 1980s, largely associated with new,
general purpose communication and information technologies.12 Also during this time, the
majority of countries engaged in widespread trade liberalization, which helped facilitate the
international diffusion of new technologies (Keller, 2004). This paper estimates the high
technological (high skilled) factor content of imports to capture the change in the arrival
rate of new technologies using a gravity model of industry-level bilateral trade. Opening
up to trade with high skilled exporters implies that trade liberalization leads to a more
pronounced change in the arrival rate of new technologies entering through trade. Using a
gravity model with importer and exporter fixed effects, the skilled factor content of trade
is estimated for 103 countries across the development spectrum. The gravity equation re-
lates the factor content of imports to bilateral geographical distance, other bilateral trade
impediments and multilateral resistance.
Advantageously, estimating the effects of factors embodied within imports controls for
potential endogeneity between changes in income inequality and changes in the arrival rate
of new technologies. Technological progress, inequality and trade flows are each endoge-
nously determined processes. So while technological progress may explain the dynamics of
inequality, the change in inequality may have an impact on the rate of technological progress.
By estimating the high skill factor content of trade based on geographic proximity to high
skilled exporters provides an exogenous proxy for changes in the arrival rate of new tech-
nologies. Therefore, the change in income inequality would have no impact on the skilled
12Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) show a faster pace of technological advancement linked to IT devel-
opment beginning in the 1970s and through the 1980s. Also see Aghion (2002).
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factor content of trade.
Estimating the high skill factor content of trade based on exogenous geographical fac-
tors and fixed effects also controls for the endogeneity of trade flows. Trade patterns are
endogenously determined in a general equilibrium model. Endowments of human capital,
education and technology matter when aggregate trade flows are determined. For example,
Romalis (2004) finds that countries capture larger shares of world production and trade
in commodities that more intensively use their abundant factor. Moreover, Romalis estab-
lishes the predictions of HOV theory hold qualitatively in the context of Krugman’s model
of monopolstic competition and transport costs. Coe and Helpman (1995), for example,
use import shares as weights for international R&D spillovers. Empirical regressions based
on import shares, however, potentially suffer from multicollinearity if two or more of the
regressors are highly correlated.
Frankel and Romer (1999) utilize a gravity model to approximate general trade open-
ness. Their paper isolates the geographical component of bilateral trade to show a causal
relation between trade and growth. Auer (2006) follows an empirical strategy similar to
Frankel and Romer to estimate the skilled factor content of trade. The gravity equations in
Frankel and Romer (1999) and Auer (2006), however, are log-linearized, and use ordinary
least squares techniques to relate the bilateral trade variable to bilateral distance, the size
of each trading partner, and, in the case of Auer (2006), the endowment of skills of the
exporter. This procedure is problematic for three important reasons, as detailed by An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) and others. First, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
show that log-linearized gravity models estimated by OLS provide biased parameters in the
presence of heteroskedasticity. Second, by log-linearizing the model, information is lost due
to zero values of the dependent variable. When using industry level, bilateral trade data,
it is not uncommon for there to be many observations with zero values. Often, small or
remote countries did not trade in each industry in a certain period. These first two issues
are addressed by estimating the model in its multiplicative form using pseudo-maximum-
likelihood regression techniques. The third issue is that the gravity equations in Frankel
58
and Romer (1999) and Auer (2006) do not take into account multilateral resistance terms.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) provide a theoretical foundation for the gravity model
which motivates the need to include the average trade barriers, or “multilateral resistance”
terms. To account for multilateral resistance I utilize importer and exporter fixed effects.
The fixed effects for exporters, for example, capture not only the endowment of skills in
the exporter country, but also any other country specific, unobservable characteristic that
impacts a country’s propensity to export high skill goods.
This paper uses 1992 bilateral trade flow data from Feenstra et al. (2005), which doc-
uments industry level bilateral trade data for the years 1962-2000.13 The productivity
adjusted unit requirement matrix for each industry is from Antweiler and Trefler (2002).
Specifically, the data contains information on the skilled labor input requirement for each
industry based on U.S. production techniques. Using the vector of input requirements, bi-
lateral trade flows are converted into the net factor content of trade. The data covers 37
tradable industries for the year 1992.14 The actual skilled factor content of bilateral trade,
for importer i and exporter o in industry j, is given by
¯skFCT j,i,o = Askj,USMj,i,o, (2.3.1)
where ¯skFCT denotes actual factor content of imports, Askj,US is the productivity adjusted
skilled factor requirement as given by Antweiler and Trefler (2002), and Mj,i,o is the imports
from o to i in industry j. Summing across industries yields the total actual skilled factor
content of trade between countries i and o, or
¯skFCT i,o =
∑
j
¯skFCT j,i,o. (2.3.2)
13Available from www.nber.org/data (International Trade Data, NBER-UN world trade data)
14Included industries: livestock, crops, forestry, fishing, coal, oil and gas, metal ore mining, other mining,
food products, beverages, tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel (except footware), leather products, footwear
(except rubber or plastic), wood products (except furniture), furniture (except metal), paper and products,
printing and publishing, industrial chemicals, other chemicals, petroleum refineries, misc. petroleum and
coal products, rubber products, plastic products, pottery, glass and products, other non-metallic mineral
productions, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, fabricated metal products, machinery (except electrical),
machinery electric, transport equipment, profession and scientific equipment, other manufactured products,
and electricity.
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The result is a balanced data set consisting of 103 countries, or (103)2 observations. The
actual skilled factor content of trade is related to bilateral distance and other bilateral
variables common in the literature, as well as importer and exporter fixed effects for the
year 1992. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), this paper uses a Poisson Psuedo-
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) approach to estimate:
¯skFCT i,o = α+ γi + γo + β1 log (DISTi,o) + β2CONTIGi,o
+β3COMLANGi,o + β4COLONYi,o + ,
(2.3.3)
where γi and γo are the importer and exporter fixed effects, CONTIG is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the countries are contiguous, COMLANG is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
countries share a common language, and COLONY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
countries share a common colonizer. DISTi,o is the population weighted distance between
importer, i, and exporter, o. The distance variable was constructed as population weighted
distances between city k in country i and city l in country o. Specifically, DISTi,o =∑
k∈i
popk
popi
∑
l∈o
popl
popo
distk,l, where the distance between two cities, distk,l, is calculated by
the Great Circle Distance Formula measured in kilometers and 32.186 kilometers is used as
inner-city distance.15 The results of the gravity model are presented in Table 2.1.
As expected, the distance between two countries is significant at the one percent level
and negatively related to aggregate trade flows, and therefore the embodied skilled factor
content of trade. Likewise, the dummy variables for common border and common language
are significant at the one percent level and are of the expected sign. The dummy variable
for sharing a common colonizer is insignificant in this specific gravity model of the high skill
factor content of trade. Finally, the fixed effects capture any country specific factor related
to the skilled factor content of imports or exports.
The predicted skilled factor content of imports for country i is attained by summing the
15All data on latitude, longitude, and population is from the World Gazetteer web page.
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Gravity Model
Dependent Variable: Skilled Factor Content, 1992
DIST -0.22947
(-2.90)***
CONTIG 1.37666
(8.08)***
COMLANG 0.41918
(3.43)***
COLONY 0.02739
(0.22)
Obs. 10609
Table 2.1: t statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** 5
percent, * 10 percent. The dependent variable is the actual bilateral skilled factor content
of imports in 1992, as described in the text. PPML estimation is used with robust standard
errors and the t-statistic is listed in the parentheses. Importer and exporter fixed effects
(not listed above) are included in the regression. The distance variable is constructed as
described in the text. The balanced data set contains 103 countries (number of observations
is 1032).
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predicted bilateral factor content of imports over all exporters for a given importer i, and
then dividing by the country’s population size. The values for the skilled factor content of
imports are listed in Table 2.2.16
Skilled Factor Content of Trade
Latin America Asia Africa
Argentina 0.0072409 Afghanistan 0.0003653 Benin 0.0012796
Bolivia 0.0025916 Bangladesh 0.0003596 Burkina Faso 0.0004021
Brazil 0.0019248 China 0.0007677 Cameroon 0.0012236
Chile 0.0107447 India 0.0003041 Cent. Afr. Rep. 0.0004295
Colombia 0.0028176 Indonesia 0.0022542 Chad 0.0002637
Costa Rica 0.0121631 Korea 0.026701 Congo 0.0002225
Dom. Rep. 0.0075502 Malaysia 0.0341533 Ethiopia 0.0002427
Ecuador 0.0037287 Myanmar 0.0003632 Gabon 0.0116976
El Salvador 0.0035435 Nepal 0.0003199 Ghana 0.0010364
Guatemala 0.0032297 Pakistan 0.001021 Guinea 0.0010161
Haiti 0.0004397 Papua N. G. 0.0037095 Kenya 0.0008151
Honduras 0.0039117 Philippines 0.0026756 Liberia 0.0407032
Jamaica 0.0124387 Singapore 0.3675235 Madagascar 0.0004126
Mexico 0.0118086 Sri Lanka 0.002081 Malawi 0.000736
Nicaragua 0.0015917 Taiwan 0.0506817 Mali 0.0004937
Panama 0.0691125 Thailand 0.0106587 Mauritania 0.0027648
Paraguay 0.0058322 Mozambique 0.0007582
Peru 0.0021504 Niger 0.000336
Suriname 0.0141919 Nigeria 0.0012159
Uruguay 0.0089918 Rwanda 0.0002771
(Continued on Next Page...)
16The predicted high skill factor content of imports for each country in the sample (103) is significantly
greater than zero at the one percent level. Standard errors were determined by bootstrapping the gravity
model to generate 50 unique values. Results are available upon request.
62
Skilled Factor Content of Trade (Continued...)
Venezuela 0.0104886 Senegal 0.0016575
Sierra Leone 0.0003352
Somalia 0.000081
South Africa 0.0072606
Sudan 0.0003527
Tanzania 0.0005785
Togo 0.0020322
Uganda 0.0002087
Yemen 0.00185
Zambia 0.0015859
Zimbabwe 0.0019223
Mean 0.0093568 0.0314962 0.0027158
Std. Dev. 0.0143338 0.0908462 0.0074208
Obs. 21 16 31
Mid. East Advanced
Algeria 0.0043277 Australia 0.0373746
Egypt 0.0027159 Austria 0.1099863
Iran 0.005022 Belgium 0.1724751
Iraq 0.000074 Bulgaria 0.003862
Israel 0.0561946 Canada 0.070257
Jordan 0.0092179 Denmark 0.0955809
Morocco 0.0039257 Finland 0.059059
Saudi Arabia 0.030682 France 0.062738
Syria 0.0030593 Germany 0.0737405
Tunisia 0.0120111 Greece 0.0320445
(Continued on Next Page...)
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Skilled Factor Content of Trade (Continued...)
UAE 0.1079606 Hungary 0.0131613
Ireland 0.0961746
Italy 0.0430329
Japan 0.0223234
Netherlands 0.1335309
New Zealand 0.0420976
Norway 0.0991316
Poland 0.0049923
Portugal 0.0464989
Spain 0.0374452
Sweden 0.0888332
Turkey 0.0052734
U.K. 0.0573415
USA 0.0336995
Mean 0.021381 0.0600272
Std. Dev. 0.0332136 0.0426681
Obs. 11 24
Table 2.2: List of the constructed high skill factor content of imports per capita. Each index
is calculated as the sum of the predicted factor content of imports from each country source
divided by the population of the importer, as described in the text. The predicted high skill
factor content of imports for each country in the sample (103) is significantly greater than
zero at the one percent level. Standard errors were determined by bootstrapping the PPML
gravity model to generate 50 unique values. Results are available upon request. Values are
in thousands of 1992 U.S. dollars.
The values in Table 2.2 are interpreted as the high skill factor content of imports divided
by the population (measured in thousands of 1992 U.S. dollars). For example, the value
for Mexico is 0.0118, which means the average skilled factor content of imports per person
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Figure 2.1: The values on the x-axis are the skilled factor content of imports divided by the
population as calculated in this paper. The values on the y-axis correspond to the predicted
skilled labor content divided by the population in Auer (2006). A total of 62 countries have
measures for the factor content of imports in both sets of data.
in Mexico is 0.0118. Higher values correspond to a higher skilled factor content of trade,
and a larger increase in the arrival rate of new technologies following trade liberalization.
The median skilled factor content of imports per person is the highest in advanced coun-
tries (0.05192), followed by Latin America (0.005832), the Middle East (0.005022), Asia
(0.002168), and Africa (0.000758) has the lowest skilled factor content of trade.
Figure 2.1 compares the calculation for the skilled factor content of trade from this
paper to that of Auer (2006). As expected there is a positive relationship between the
two measures for the factor content of trade, however the calculations from this paper are
larger in magnitude. The reason is that Auer (2006) only considers the average years of
education of the exporter to capture the high skill content of exports. By using multilateral
resistance terms, the measure from this paper captures all factors specific to each exporter
that contributes to a larger skilled factor content of exports.
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2.3.4 Summary of Data
The vector of other explanatory variables, X ′, includes GDP per capita, a dummy vari-
able for advanced countries, regional dummy variables (Asia, Latin America, Africa and
Middle East/North Africa) and overall trade openness. The inclusion of the GDP per
capita (data from the Penn World Tables 6.2, Heston et al., 2006) controls for other factors
that depend on the level of development. The dummy variable for advanced countries cap-
tures systematic differences in the dynamics of inequality between developed and developing
countries. Regional dummy variables capture other systematic differences across develop-
ing countries. A measure for corruption from Transparency International is included as a
robustness check. Finally, I include the Frankel and Romer (1999) measure for “natural
openness”, based on domestic population size and proximity to large markets. This allows
for the consideration of the effects of the technology embodied within trade while holding
constant a measure of the extent of trade.
Table 2.3 summarizes the data central to the empirical analysis, broken up into regions:
Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and advanced countries, which includes the
U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and most of Europe. The table describes the
log change in the Theil index from 1980-90 and 1980-95, the quality of education, the skilled
factor content of trade (skFCT) and the log change in the fraction of the population with
skills between 1980 and 1990.
Table 2.3 provides some interesting insights. Inequality grew between 1980 and 1990
in each group of countries, despite significant overall skill upgrading during the this time
period (the log change in the fraction of the labor force with higher education was positive
in each region). The growth of inequality was most substantial in Latin America. This
region is characterized by a high skill factor content of trade and a low average quality of
education. Asia, on the other hand, had a low skill factor content of trade and a high quality
of education, which contributed to a very low growth of inequality (the median log change of
inequality was actually negative between 1980 and 1995). The advanced countries, similar
to Asia, had a high quality of education, but also the highest skill factor content. Inequality
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Summary Statistics
∆ log Theil ∆ log Theil Quality of ∆ log skPop
1980-90 1980-95 Education skFCT 1980-90
Africa Obs. 17 10 15 31 25
Median 0.551 0.372 38.90 0.0007582 0.423
Mean 0.451 0.198 39.20 0.0027158 0.559
Std. Dev. 0.495 0.627 9.43 0.0074208 0.617
Min. -0.563 -0.814 25.58 0.0000809 -0.624
Max. 1.116 0.990 54.95 0.0407032 1.705
Latin Obs. 18 15 21 21 23
America Median 0.634 0.728 39.34 0.0058322 0.478
Mean 0.599 0.566 40.22 0.0093568 0.486
Std. Dev. 0.550 0.585 9.60 0.0143338 0.202
Min. -1.027 -1.233 24.74 0.0004397 0.015
Max. 1.484 1.178 59.80 0.0691125 0.942
Asia Obs. 13 11 13 16 18
Median 0.154 -0.039 54.29 0.0021676 0.515
Mean 0.142 0.012 49.57 0.0314962 0.467
Std. Dev. 0.528 0.549 16.74 0.0908462 0.388
Min. -0.460 -0.582 20.80 0.0003041 -0.288
Max. 1.188 1.238 72.13 0.3675235 1.099
Middle Obs. 11 9 11 11 11
East/ Median 0.266 0.229 28.06 0.0050220 0.546
North Afr. Mean 0.435 0.494 32.70 0.0213810 0.551
Std. Dev. 0.570 0.633 11.43 0.0332136 0.301
Min. -0.297 -0.158 18.26 0.0000740 0.057
Max. 1.419 1.671 54.46 0.1079606 0.916
Advanced Obs. 23 22 27 24 25
Countries Median 0.193 0.531 56.61 0.0519202 0.271
Mean 0.219 0.665 55.47 0.0600273 0.350
Std. Dev. 0.583 0.748 7.15 0.0426681 0.290
Min. -1.742 -1.076 39.72 0.0038620 -0.122
Max. 1.598 2.199 67.06 0.1724751 1.099
Full Obs. 82 67 88 103 103
Sample Median 0.309 0.476 46.35 0.0038620 0.422
Mean 0.367 0.443 45.32 0.0238880 0.473
Std. Dev. 0.560 0.677 13.15 0.0478080 0.398
Min. -1.742 -1.233 18.26 0.0000740 -0.624
Max. 1.598 2.199 72.13 0.3675235 1.705
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
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grew more in advanced economies between 1980 and 1995 than each of the other regions
except for Latin America. A cursory look at the data suggests the growth of inequality was
most severe in countries with a high skill factor content of imports and a low quality of
education.
2.4 Estimation Results
The empirical analysis considers the role of the quality of education, the quantity of
education, the changes in the arrival rate of new technologies and changes in the endow-
ment of skills in explaining the dynamics of income inequality. I proceed, first, with cross
sectional regressions using the log change of inequality from both 1980-1990 and 1980-1995
as dependent variables. I, then, subdivide the data into three time intervals (1980-1985,
1985-1990, and 1990-1995) and estimate panel regressions. I show robust evidence that a
higher skill factor content of trade increases the growth of inequality, while both the quality
and the quantity of education directly reduce the changes of inequality. In addition, the
interaction terms are equally important. A higher quality of education reduces the impact
of new technologies on the growth of inequality whereas the interaction of the quantity of
education and skill factor content of trade is insignificant. The impact of changes in the
arrival rate of new technologies depends on the quality of education, rather than its quantity.
The interaction between the quality and quantity of education is also important. Specifi-
cally, the role of the quality of education in driving the dynamics of education is stronger
when the average years of education is low. Thus, the quality of education is even more
important for developing countries whose average years of education is relatively less than
in advanced economies. Finally, the qualitative results carry through for each of the time
intervals, however the absolute magnitude and significance of the results increase over the
longer time frame, 1980-1995.
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2.4.1 Empirical Results: 1980 - 1990
Table 2.4 presents the results for equation (2.2.17), which regresses the log change in
inequality between 1980 and 1990 against the skill factor content of trade, the quality and
quantity of education, the change in the relative stock of skilled workers over the same
time period, and the three interactions among the skilled factor content of trade and the
educational variables (all in logs).
The ordinary least squares regressions of equation (2.2.17) are split into six columns. The
first column contains only the key variables of interest, while column (2) adds a measure of
overall trade openness. Column (3) includes trade openness and the initial real GDP per
capita. Column (4) includes a dummy variable for advanced economies and the measure
for overall trade openness. Column (5) contains trade openness and regional dummy vari-
ables for the Middle East/North Africa, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and column (6)
uses a combination of overall trade openness, initial GDP per capita and regional dummy
variables.17
In columns (1) - (4) the skilled factor content of imports is significant and positive at
the one percent level. Even after controlling for regional differences, as in columns (5) and
(6), the coefficient remains positive and significant. A larger change in the arrival rate of
new technologies increases the growth of income inequality, however, the strength of this
effect depends on the quality of education. The interaction between the skill factor content
of imports and the quality of education is negative and significant at the one percent level.
A higher quality of education reduces the impact of new technologies on the growth of
inequality. The interaction with the quantity of education (measured using the average
years of education) with the skilled factor content is insignificantly different from zero.18
Overall, it is the quality of education, rather than the quality of education, that reduces the
17Each regression also included the Corruption Perceptions Index provided by Transparency International.
Two measures were included. The first is the average corruption index for 1980-1985. This measure is not
available for a large number of countries, so the overall average corruption measure is also used to expand
the number of countries with available data. For each specification, corruption increased the growth of
inequality but this effect was not significantly different from zero. These results are not included in this
section, but are available upon request.
18When this interaction is dropped from the regression analysis, there is little change to the significance
and magnitude of the other variables. See the appendix for results.
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Regression Results #1
Dependent Variable: ∆ log Theil, 1980 - 1990
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
skFCT 1.365 1.385 1.205 1.329 0.749 0.829
(3.350)*** (3.490)*** (3.480)*** (3.210)*** (1.780)* (1.730)*
QL -4.014 -4.092 -3.639 -3.800 -2.939 -3.205
(-3.770)*** (-3.790)*** (-3.450)*** (-3.630)*** (-1.940)* (-1.790)*
skFCT ∗QL -0.391 -0.399 -0.343 -0.372 -0.221 -0.245
(-4.390)*** (-4.630)*** (-4.130)*** (-3.880)*** (-1.770)* (-1.680)*
Y EARS -5.509 -5.514 -5.420 -5.219 -5.748 -6.016
(-2.290)** (-2.350)** (-2.290)** (-2.300)** (-2.180)** (-2.180)**
skFCT ∗ Y EARS 0.032 0.030 -0.056 -0.005 -0.006 -0.020
(0.290) (0.270) (-0.510) (-0.040) (-0.050) (-0.160)
QL ∗ Y EARS 1.447 1.459 1.295 1.325 1.431 1.478
(2.510)** (2.540)** (2.220)** (2.430)** (2.030)** (2.030)**
∆nhnl -0.234 -0.225 -0.225 -0.211 -0.131 -0.153
(-1.350) (-1.280) (-1.270) (-1.190) (-0.810) (-0.880)
Openness 0.047 0.102 0.056 0.032 0.065
(0.430) (0.880) (0.500) (0.290) (0.410)
GDPp.c. (1980) 0.327 0.118
(1.900)* (0.430)
Advanced 0.155
(1.010)
Mideast -0.190 -0.209
(-0.680) (-0.680)
Africa -0.304 -0.240
(-1.360) (-0.960)
Latin America 0.155 0.165
(0.630) (0.660)
Asia -0.430 -0.340
(-2.180)** (-1.090)
Constant 15.398 15.444 11.146 14.568 11.589 11.472
(3.460)*** (3.570)*** (2.580)** (3.440)*** (2.210)** (2.250)**
N 59 59 59 59 59 59
R squared 0.191 0.195 0.246 0.204 0.320 0.323
Table 2.4: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** 5 percent,
* 10 percent. OLS estimation is used for each regression with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the log change of the Theil index between 1980 and 1990.
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impact of new technologies on the change in inequality.
The elasticity of inequality growth with respect to the skilled factor content of trade on
the change in inequality is a function of the educational variables. For example, in column (4)
the elasticity for the proxy of new technologies is (1.329− 0.372 logQL+ 0.03 log Y EARS).
As the quality of education increases, the effect of new technologies on the growth of in-
equality falls. For example, for Bolivia, whose quality of education is 27.47, this elasticity
implies that a ten percent increase in the skilled factor content of trade increases the growth
of inequality by 1.42 percent. For Mexico, whose quality of education is 37.24, a ten percent
increase in the factor content of trade increases the growth of inequality by only 0.3 percent.
A ten point increase in the quality of education significantly reduces the growth of inequality
results from the diffusion of new technologies through trade.
While the quality of education is the only significant education variable interacted with
the skilled factor content of imports, both the quality and quantity of education significantly
reduce the growth of income inequality. In fact, the direct coefficients on the average years
of education are larger in magnitude than the direct coefficients on the quality of education,
especially once controlling for regional differences. However, the total effect of each of the
educational variables depends on one another and the skilled factor content of imports.
Again focusing on column (4) from Table 2.4, the elasticity of the quality of education
is (−3.8− 0.372 log skFCT + 1.325 log Y EARS). A higher skFCT implies the quality of
education becomes more important in reducing the growth of inequality. A higher average
years of education, Y EARS, however, reduces the impact of the quality of education on
the dynamics of inequality. This suggests the quality of education is more important to
the dynamics of inequality for developing countries with relatively low average years of
education.
The change in the stock of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers is, as expected,
negatively related to the change in inequality. An increase in the relative number of skilled
workers reduces income inequality, however the coefficient is not quite significant at the ten
percent level. Finally, it is interesting that the initial level of development (log of the real
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GDP per capita in 1980) is positive and significant at the ten percent level. This implies
the growth of inequality was greater for developed countries. However, the inverted U-shape
relationship between inequality and income, as proposed in the Kuznets hypothesis, implies
the growth of inequality should be declining with income. When including regional dummy
variables, the story becomes more clear. The growth of inequality in Asian countries is
significantly less than the growth of inequality in advanced economies, even after controlling
for the impact of new technologies and other educational factors. Finally, the Frankel-Romer
measure of overall trade openness is not significant in the cross country regressions. This
result implies that it is the high technological component of trade that impacts the growth
of inequality, rather than trade itself.
2.4.2 Empirical Results: 1980 - 1995
The regressions are duplicated over a slightly extended time interval, 1980 to 1995.
The results echo those in the previous subsection, however the absolute magnitude of the
variables increases by a factor between 2 and 3. Overall, this supports the idea that the
new technologies and the quality of education are important, long lasting determinants of
the dynamics of income inequality. Table 2.5 presents the results for equation (2.2.17) for
the change in inequality between 1980 and 1995.
The coefficients are consistent across each of the six columns in Table 2.5, although much
larger in absolute magnitude than the regression coefficients from 1980 - 1990. Beginning
with the skilled factor content of trade, the implied total elasticity in column (6) is given by
(3.014− 0.678 logQL− 0.325 log Y EARS). Again, a higher quality of education reduces the
impact of a faster arrival rate of new technologies on the dynamics of inequality. Moreover,
the relative magnitude is roughly equal to those of the shorter time interval.
The quantity of education does not significantly reduce the impact of new technologies.
The direct impact of the quality and quantity of education is, as expected, negative and
significant and the interaction between the two variables is positive. This suggests that
the quality of education is a relatively more important determinant for the dynamics of
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Regression Results #2
Dependent Variable: ∆ log Theil, 1980 - 1995
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
skFCT 3.213 3.225 2.727 2.967 2.814 3.014
(5.310)*** (5.450)*** (4.460)*** (4.790)*** (3.180)*** (3.540)***
QL -10.106 -10.112 -9.356 -9.016 -8.901 -9.854
(-5.220)*** (-5.150)*** (-4.940)*** (-4.530)*** (-3.240)*** (-3.670)***
skFCT ∗QL -0.764 -0.763 -0.660 -0.691 -0.612 -0.678
(-5.050)*** (-5.010)*** (-4.400)*** (-4.110)*** (-2.660)** (-2.940)***
Y EARS -15.385 -15.480 -14.903 -13.668 -14.692 -15.798
(-3.490)*** (-3.450)*** (-3.510)*** (-3.250)*** (-3.030)*** (-3.410)***
skFCT ∗ Y EARS -0.169 -0.173 -0.219 -0.217 -0.296 -0.325
(-0.780) (-0.790) (-1.040) (-1.040) (-1.270) (-1.450)
QL ∗ Y EARS 3.869 3.881 3.643 3.326 3.508 3.747
(3.830)*** (3.780)*** (3.700)*** (3.440)*** (3.090)*** (3.470)***
∆nhnl -0.111 -0.117 -0.127 -0.101 -0.105 -0.151
(-0.610 (-0.650 (-0.770 (-0.600 (-0.650 (-0.850
Openness -0.024 0.076 0.022 0.012 0.097
(-0.200) (0.560) (0.190) (0.090) (0.630)
GDPp.c. (1980) 0.448 0.334
(1.760)* (0.890)
Advanced 0.468
(2.410)**
Mideast -0.476 -0.500
(-1.710)* (-1.750)*
Africa -0.218 -0.075
(-0.620) (-0.240)
Latin America -0.348 -0.329
(-1.210) (-1.110)
Asia -0.591 -0.335
(-2.340)** (-0.980)
Constant 40.257 40.463 33.149 36.268 36.913 37.275
(4.930)*** (4.890)*** (3.660)*** (4.390)*** (3.340)*** (3.550)***
N 52 52 52 52 52 52
R squared 0.355 0.355 0.396 0.413 0.431 0.443
Table 2.5: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** 5 percent,
* 10 percent. OLS estimation is used for each regression with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the log change of the Theil index between 1980 and 1995.
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inequality in countries with (1) a higher skill factor content of trade, and (2) lower average
years of education.
The real GDP per capita in 1980 and the dummy for advanced economies, columns
(3) and (4), are positive and significant at the ten and five percent levels respectively.
This suggests a systematic higher growth of inequality in developed countries compared
to developing countries. Including regional dummies for developing countries, columns (5)
and (6), reveal it is the Middle East/North Africa and Asia that has a systematically lower
growth of inequality, with each dummy being significant at the five percent level. General
trade openness remains insignificant.
2.4.3 Empirical Results with Pooled Data
This section pools the data across three intervals to, again, show the importance of the
interaction between changes in the rate of technological progress and educational variables
in accounting for the growth of income inequality. Specifically, the data is divided into three
periods: 1980-85, 1985-90, and 1990-95, where the dependent variable is the log change
of inequality during the specified time period. Dummy variables are included for each of
the sets of years, where “Time: 1985-90” is equal to one if the dependent variable is the
log change of inequality between 1985 and 1990, and “Time: 1990-95” is equal to one if
the dependent variables is the log change of inequality between 1990 and 1995. Table 2.6
present the results.
The results obtained from the pooled regression, shown in Table 2.6, confirm the cross-
sectional results from above. A higher skilled factor content of imports, along with lower
qualities and quantities of education increase the growth of inequality. Moreover, the quality
of education significantly reduces the impact of new technologies on the growth of inequality,
whereas the interaction between the skilled factor content of imports and the quantity of
education is consistently insignificant. Overall trade openness, the log change in the relative
stock of high skill workers, along with the time dummy variables, are insignificant, while the
growth of inequality in Asia is significantly less than the growth in advanced economies.
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Regression Results #3
Dependent Variable: ∆ log Theil, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
skFCT 0.672 0.687 0.647 0.660 0.483 0.476
(3.04)*** (3.11)*** (2.90)*** (2.93)*** (1.99)** (1.87)*
QL -2.337 -2.387 -2.314 -2.184 -1.890 -1.868
(-3.56)*** (-3.58)*** (-3.46)*** (-3.27)*** (-2.66)*** (-2.32)**
skFCT ∗QL -0.200 -0.206 -0.198 -0.193 -0.149 -0.147
(-4.41)*** (-4.38)*** (-3.99)*** (-3.85)*** (-2.67)*** (-2.35)**
Y EARS -3.247 -3.245 -3.271 -2.983 -3.062 -3.046
(-2.42)** (-2.44)** (-2.46)** (-2.28)** (-2.22)** (-2.12)**
skFCT ∗ Y EARS 0.028 0.030 0.130 0.008 0.012 0.012
(0.47) (0.51) (0.23) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19)
QL ∗ Y EARS 0.913 0.920 0.894 0.810 0.825 0.822
(3.01)*** (3.05)*** (2.96)*** (2.74)*** (2.62)*** (2.53)**
∆nhnl -0.185 -0.174 -0.189 -0.168 -0.074 -0.069
(-0.61) (-0.58) (-0.66) (-0.56) (-0.25) (-0.22)
Openness 0.023 0.037 0.029 0.021 -0.018
(0.41) (0.70) (0.54) (0.43) (0.35)
GDPp.c. (1980) 0.102 -0.012
(1.23) (-0.08)
Advanced 0.144
(2.19)**
Mideast -0.145 -0.144
(-0.94) (-0.90)
Africa -0.204 -0.209
(-1.59) (-1.40)
Latin America -0.051 -0.053
(-0.56) (-0.55)
Asia -0.228 -0.237
(-2.93)*** (-1.60)
Time: 1985-90 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.087 0.087 0.087
(1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (1.19) (1.18) (1.17)
Time: 1990-95 0.099 0.100 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.101
(1.38) (1.39) (1.40) (1.43) (1.39) (1.36)
Constant 8.420 8.471 7.316 7.852 6.884 6.922
(3.00)*** (3.03)*** (2.53)** (2.82)*** (2.33)** (2.37)**
N 172 172 172 172 172 172
R squared 0.112 0.113 0.121 0.126 0.142 0.142
Table 2.6: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** 5 percent,
* 10 percent. OLS estimation is used for each regression with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the log change of the Theil index for three time intervals: 1980-85,
1985-90, and 1990-95.
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2.5 Conclusions
This paper emphasizes the importance of the quality of education in the determination of
the dynamics of inequality, most notably during times of rapid technological progress. Not
only did countries with a higher quality of education experience less growth in inequality,
but the impact of technological progress was lessened as well. Consider the rapid growth
of inequality during the 1980s. This decade was marked by the rapid development of new
information and communication technologies, and also widespread trade liberalization facil-
itating the diffusion of new technologies throughout developing countries. This paper shows
a robust positive relationship between the high skill factor content of trade and the growth
of income inequality. Moreover, a higher quality of education lessens the magnitude of this
relationship. This is an important contribution to explaining the low growth of inequality in
Asia with a high quality of education, and the rapid growth of inequality in Latin America
and Africa.
To illustrate the importance of the quality of education, consider the case of Brazil,
an emerging economy that significantly reduced trade barriers during the 1980s and 1990s.
Specifically, the average tariff rate fell from 41.2 percent to 17.8 percent from the late 1980s to
the early 1990s, while the value of imports more than tripled between 1988 and 1995, growing
from $14,605 to $49,859 millions of US dollars (Source: Central Bank of Brazil). The quality
of the labor force given by the Hanushek and Kimko (2000) measure for Brazil is 36.60 and,
using the empirical estimates provided in column (4) from Table 2.5, the projected growth
of income inequality between 1980 and 1995 is 41.22 percent. However, had the quality of
the labor force been equal to that in Indonesia (42.99), the projected growth of inequality
would be reduced to 26.36 percent. Furthermore, using the quality of the labor force of
Thailand (46.26), the expected growth of inequality falls to only 19.59 percent. Improving
the quality of education not only directly reduces the growth of inequality, but also lessens
the impact of new technologies embodied within trade.
The finding that the quality of education lessens the growth of inequality provides em-
pirical support for the Nelson-Phelps view of skill biased technological change. This theory,
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extended by Galor and Moav (2000) and Aghion (2002) among others, emphasizes the com-
parative advantage of skilled workers at adapting to faster rates of technological change. If
the quality of education is high, the labor force as a whole is better equipped to learn the new
technologies, thus reducing the comparative advantaged held by skilled workers. Further-
more, the results suggest careful attention should be placed on the effects of technological
change on the effective human capital. Faster rates of technological change have implications
not only for the relative demand for skills, but also the relative efficiency of the different skill
cohorts. The intuitive results support the Nelson-Phelps view of the relationship between
technological change and income inequality.
This is the principle policy implication as well. Investment in the quality of education
is vital during periods of rapid technological progress. The effects of globalization and
the spread of new technologies on income inequality is especially important to emerging
economies. Without strong investment into improving the quality of education, a rapid
increase in the arrival rate of new technologies is shown to contribute to rapid growth of
income inequality.

78
Bibliography
1. Acemoglu, D. (1998). Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Tech-
nical Change and Wage Inequality. Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIII, 1055-1090.
2. Acemoglu, D. (2002). Technical Change, Inequality and the Labor Market. Journal
of Economic Literature 40, 7-72.
3. Acemoglu, D. (2003). Patterns of Skill Premium. The Review of Economic Studies,
70(2), 199-230.
4. Aghion, P. (2002). Schumpeterian Growth Theory and the Dynamics of Income In-
equality. Econometrica, 70(3), 855-882.
5. Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. (1992). A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction.
Econometrica, 60(2), 323-351.
6. Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
7. Aghion, P., Howitt, P. & Violante, G. (2002). General Purpose Technology and Wage
Inequality. Journal of Economic Growth, 7(4), 315-345.
8. Anderson, J. & van Wincoop, E. (2003). Gravity with Gravitas. American Economic
Review, 93, 170-92.
9. Anderson, J. & van Wincoop, E. (2004). Trade Costs. Journal of Economic Literature,
42, 691-751.
10. Antweiler, W. & Trefler, D. (2002). Increasing Returns and All That: A View from
Trade. American Economic Review, 92(1), 93-119.
11. Atkinson, A. (1997). Bringing Income Distribution From the Cold. Economic Journal.
107, 297-321.
12. Auer, R. (2006). Human Capital and the Dynamic Effects of Trade. MIT Job Market
Paper, February.
13. Autor, D., Katz, L. & Kearney, M. (2005). Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Re-
Assessing the Revisionist. NBER working paper 11627.
14. Autor, D., Katz, L., & Krueger, A. (1998). Computing Inequality: Have Computers
Changed the Labor Market? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1169-1214.
15. Barro, R. & Lee, J. (2000). International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates
and Implications. CID Working Paper No. 42.
16. Barro, R. & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992). Convergence. The Journal of Political Economy,
100(2), 223-251.
17. Barro, R. & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997). Technological diffusion, convergence, and growth.
Journal of Economic Growth 2(1), 126.
79
18. Barro, R. & Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004). Economic Growth, Second Edition. MIT Press,
MA.
19. Bartel, A. & Sicherman, N. (1998). Technological Change and the Skill Acquisition of
Young Workers. Journal of Labor Economics, 16(4), 718-755.
20. Bartel, A. & Sicherman, N. (1999). Technological Change and Wages: An Inter-
Industry Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 107(2), 285-325.
21. Behrman, J., Birdsall, N. & Szekely, M. (2000). Intergenerational Mobility in Latin
America: Deeper Markets and Better Schools Make a Difference. New Markets, new
opportunities? Economic and social mobility in a changing world. Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.
22. Berman, E., Bound, J. & Griliches, Z. (1994) Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor
Within U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 367-
397.
23. Berman, E., Bound, J. & Machin, S. (1998). Implications of Skill-Biased Technological
Change: International Evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1245-1279.
24. Bound, J. & Johnson, G. (1992). Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980’s: An
Evaluation of Alternative Explanations. American Economic Review, 82(3), 371-92.
25. Card, D. & DiNardo, J. (2002). Skill-Based Technological Change And Rising Wage
Inequality: Some Problems And Puzzles,” Journal of Labor Economics, 20(4), 733-783.
26. Card, D., Kramarz, F. & Lemieux, T. (1999). Changes in the Relative Structure of
Wages and Employment: A Comparison of the United States, Canada and France.
Canadian Journal of Economics, 32(4), 843-877.
27. Caselli, F. (1999). Technological Revolutions. American Economic Review, 89(1),
78-102.
28. Coe, D. & Helpman, E. (1995). International R&D Spillovers. European Economic
Review, 39, 859-87.
29. Conceicao, P. & Galbraith, J. (2000). Technology Adoption and Inequality: Empirical
Evidence from a Selection of OECD Countries. 33rd Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences, vol. 7.
30. Connolly, M. (2003). The Dual Nature of Trade: Measuring its Impact on Imitation
and Growth. Journal of Development Economics, 72(1), 31-55.
31. Connolly, M. & Valderrama D. (2005). Implications of Intellectual Property Rights
for Dynamics Gains from Trade. American Economic Review, 318-322.
32. Connolly, M. & Valderrama D. (2007). North-South Technological Diffusion: A New
Case for Dynamic Gains from Trade. Working Paper.
33. Das, S.P. (2002). Foreign Direct Investment and the Relative Wage in a Developing
Country. Journal of Development Economics, 67, 55-77.
80
34. De Gregorio, J. & Lee, J. (2002). Education and Income Inequality: New Evidence
from Cross-Country Data. Review of Income and Wealth, 48(3), 395-416.
35. Deininger, K. & Squire, L. (1996). A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality. The
World Bank Economic Review, 10(3), 565-591.
36. Desjonqueres, T., Machin, S. & van Reenen, J. (1999). Another Nail in the Coffin?
Or Can the Trade Based Explanation of Changing Skill Structures Be Resurrected?
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101, 533-554.
37. Dickens, W. & Katz, L. F. (1987). Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Industry
Characteristics, in Lang, K., Leonard, J. (eds.), Unemployment and the Structure of
Labor Markets, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
38. Dinopoulos E. & Segerstrom, P. (1999). A Schumpeterian Model of Protection and
Relative Wages. American Economic Review, 89, 450-472.
39. Dinopoulos E. & Segerstrom, P. (2006). North-South Trade and Economic Growth.
Working Paper.
40. Duryea, S. & Szekely, M. (2000). Labor markets in Latin America: a look at the
supply-side. Emerging Markets Review, 1(3), 199-228.
41. Eicher, T. & Turnovsky, S. (2001). Transitional dynamics in a two-sector non-scale
growth model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(1-2), 85-113.
42. Feenstra, R., Lipsey, R., Deng, H., Ma, A. & Mo, H. (2005). World Trade Flows:
1962-2000. NBER Working Paper 11040.
43. Ferguson, R. (1993). New Evidence on the Growing Value of Skill and Consequences
for Racial Disparity and Return to Schooling. Harvard University, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Faculty Research Working Paper R93-94.
44. Frankel, J. & Romer, D. (1999). Does Trade Cause Growth. American Economic
Review, 89, 379-399.
45. Galor, O. (1996). Convergence? Inferences from Theoretical Models. The Economic
Journal, 106(437), 1056-1069.
46. Galor, O. & Moav, O. (2000). Ability Biased Technological Transition, Wage Inequal-
ity and Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2), 469-499.
47. Galor, O. & Tsiddon, D. (1997). Technological Progress, Mobility, and Economic
Growth. The American Economic Review, 87(3), 363-382.
48. Goldin, C. & Katz, L. (1998). The Origins of Technology-Skill Complementarity.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 693-732.
49. Greenwood, J. & Yorukoglu, M. (1997). 1974. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, 46, 49-95.
50. Grieben, W. (2005). A Schumpeterian North-South Growth Model of Trade and Wage
Inequality. Review of International Economics, 13(1), 106-128.
81
51. Grossman, G. & Helpman, E. (1991). Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy.
MIT Press, MA.
52. Griliches, Z. & Mason W. (1972). Education, Income, and Ability. Journal of Political
Economy, 80(3), 74-103.
53. Hanson, G. & Harrison, A. (1999). Trade, Technology and Wage Inequality. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 52, 271-288.
54. Hanushek, E. & Kimko, D. (2000). Schooling, Labor-Force Quality, and the Growth
of Nations. The American Economic Review, 90(5), 1184-1208.
55. Haskel, J. & Heden, Y. (1999). Computers and the Demand for Skilled Labour:
Industry- and Establishment-Level Panel Evidence for the UK. Economic Journal,
109, C68-C79.
56. Helpman, E., Editor (1998). General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
57. Heston, A., Summers, R. & Aten B. (2009). Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of
Pennsylvania.
58. Jorgenson, D. (2001). Information Technology and the U.S. Economy. American
Economic Review, 91, 1-32.
59. Juhn, C., Murphy, K. & Pierce, B. (1993). Wage Inequality and the Rise in the
Returns to Skill. Journal of Political Economy, 101(3), 41-55.
60. Katz, L. (1999). Technological Change, Computerization, and the Wage Structure.
Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Economics Harvard University.
61. Katz, L. & Murphy, K. (1992). Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and
Demand Factors. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), 35-78.
62. Keller, W. (2004). International Technology Diffusion. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 42, 752-782.
63. Krueger, A. (1993). How Computers Have Changed the Wage Structure: Evidence
From Microdata, 1984-1989. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), 33-61.
64. Krusell, P., Ohanian, L., Rios-Rull, J. & Violante, G. (2000). Capital-Skill Comple-
mentarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis. Econometrica, 68(5), 1029-
1054.
65. Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic Growth and Income Inequality. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 45(1), 1-28.
66. Levy, F. & Murnane, R. (1992). U.S. Earnings Levels an Earnings Inequality: A
Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations. Journal of Economic Literature,
30(3), 13331381.
82
67. Lloyd-Ellis, H. (1999). Endogenous Technological Change and Wage Inequality. The
American Economic Review, 89(1), 47-77.
68. Machin, S. (1996). Wage Inequality in the U.K. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
12(1), 47-64.
69. Machin, S. & van Reenen, J. (1998). Technology and Changes in Skill Structure:
Evidence from Seven OECD Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 1215-
1244.
70. Michaely, M., Papageorgiou, D., & Choksi, A. (1991). Liberalizing Foreign Trade:
Lessons of Experience in the Developing World. vol. 7. Blackwell, Basil, Oxford.
71. Murnane, R., Willett, J., & Levy, F. (1995). The Growing Importance of Cognitive
Skills in Wage Determination. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(2), 251-266.
72. Nelson, R. & Phelps, E. (1966). Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, and
Economic Growth. American Economic Review 56, 69-75.
73. Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (1994). Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? American
Economic Review, 84(3), 600-621.
74. Quah, D. (1993). Empirical Cross-Section Dynamics in Economic Growth. European
Economic Review, 37(2/3), 426-434.
75. Quah, D. (1996a). Convergence Empirics Across Economies with (some) Capital Mo-
bility. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(1), 95-124.
76. Quah, D. (1996b). Aggregate and Regional Disaggregate Fluctuations. Empirical
Economics, 21(1), 137-159.
77. Ramalis, J. (2004). Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade. Amer-
ican Economics Review, 94(1), 67-97.
78. Reilly, K. (1995). Human Capital and Information: The Employer Size-Wage Effect.
Journal of Human Resources, 30, pp. 1-18.
79. Ripoll, M. (2005). Trade liberalization and the Skill Premium in Developing Economies.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(3), 601-619.
80. Robbins, D. (1996). Evidence on trade and wages in the developing world. OECD
Development Centre Technical Papers, 119.
81. Sala-i-Martin, X. (2006). The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and ...
Convergence Period. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 351-397.
82. Santos Silva, J. & Tenreyro, S. (2006). The Log of Gravity. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 88(4), 641-658.
83. Sener, M. (2001). Schumpeterian Unemployment, Trade, and Wages. Journal of
International Economics, 54(1), 119-148.
84. Tan, H. & Batra, G. (1997). Technology and Firm Size-Wage Differentials in Colombia,
Mexico and Taiwan (China). The World Bank Economic Review, 11, 59-83.
83
85. Theil, H. (1967). Economics and Information Theory. Rand McNally and Company,
Chicago.
86. UTIP-UNIDO, (2002). University of Texas Inequality Project, http://utip.gov.utexas.edu.
87. Wood, A. (1994). North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality. Claredon Press,
Oxford.
88. Wood, A. (1997). Openness and wage inequality in developing countries: The Latin
American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom. The World Bank Economic
Review, 11, 3357.
89. Zeira, J. (2007). Wage Inequality, Technology, and Trade. Journal of Economic The-
ory, 137, 79-103.
90. Zhu, S.C. & Trefler, D. (2001). Ginis in General Equilibrium: Trade, Technology and
Southern Inequality. NBER Working Paper No. 8446.
84
Appendix A. Quality of Education
Table 1 summarizes the quality of education measure from Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
The measures for the quality of the labor force are derived from a number of international
mathematics and science tests between the years 1965 through 1991. While test score data
is available for only 39 countries, Hanushek and Kimko use consistent estimators to forecast
labor force quality for a large number of countries based on country specific characteristics.
The International math and science tests were conducted by the International Association for
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement and the International Assessment of Educational
Progress. Hanushek and Kimko produce two quality measures for countries across the
development spectrum. The first measure converts the test scores to a mean of 50. This,
however, assumes that the world performance in math and science in constant over time.
The second measure (detailed in Table 1) relaxes this assumption, and allows for the global
mean to drift based on the performance of U.S. students over time.
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Labor-Force Quality Data
Advanced Latin America Asia Africa Mid. East
Australia 59.04 Bolivia 27.47 China 64.42 Botswana 31.71 Algeria 28.06
Austria 56.61 Brazil 36.60 Hong Kong 71.85 Cameroon 42.36 Bahrain 23.19
Belgium 57.08 Chile 24.74 Indonesia 42.99 Congo 50.90 Cyprus 46.24
Canada 54.58 Colombia 37.87 Korea 58.55 Ghana 25.58 Egypt 26.43
Denmark 61.76 Ecuador 38.99 Malaysia 54.29 Kenya 29.95 Iran 18.26
Finland 59.55 Honduras 28.59 Philippines 33.54 Lesotho 51.95 Iraq 27.50
France 56 Mexico 37.24 Singapore 72.13 Mauritius 54.95 Israel 54.46
Germany 48.68 Peru 41.18 Taiwan 56.32 Mozambique 27.94 Jordan 42.48
Greece 50.88 Uruguay 52.27 Thailand 46.26 Nigeria 38.90 Kuwait 22.50
Hungary 61.23 Venezuela 39.08 Fiji 58.10 S. Africa 51.30 Syria 30.23
Iceland 51.2 Argentina 48.50 Papua N.G. 22.58 Swaziland 40.26 Tunisia 40.50
Ireland 50.2 Barbados 59.80 Sri Lanka 42.57 Togo 32.60
Italy 49.41 Costa Rica 46.15 India 20.80 Zaire 33.53
Japan 65.5 Dom. Rep. 39.34 Zambia 36.61
Netherlands 54.52 El Salvador 26.21 Zimbabwe 39.64
New Zealand 67.06 Guyana 51.49
Norway 64.56 Jamaica 48.62
Poland 64.37 Nicaragua 27.30
Portugal 44.22 Panama 46.78
Spain 51.92 Paraguay 39.96
Sweden 57.43 Trin. & Tob. 46.43
Switzerland 61.37
Turkey 37.72
U.K. 62.52
U.S.A. 46.77
Luxembourg 44.49
Malta 57.14
Median 56.61 40.22 49.57 39.20 32.70
Std. Dev. 7.15 9.60 16.74 9.43 11.43
Obs. 27 21 13 15 11
Table A.1: Data is the QL2 measure from Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
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Appendix B. Detailed Equations
Northern and Southern Average Profits
This appendix provides more details for equations (1.3.17) and (1.3.18). Firms located
in the North whose closest competitor is a Northern firm obtain a flow sum of domestic and
export profits,
Domestic Profits Export Profits
piNN =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(q − 1)HNΛNQN +
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(q − 1) (1 + τXS)
(
P˜
1 + τXS
) 1
1−α
HSΛSQN .
(B.0.1)
where ΛN = A
1/(1−α)
N
(
α
q
)1/(1−α)
, and QN =
∫ 1
0
qkNjα/(1−α)dj is the average quality level
on the frontier. Northern firms facing Southern competition, likewise, earn a sum of import
and export profits
Domestic Profits
piNS =
︷ ︸︸ ︷(
qP˜ (1 + τXN )− 1
)( 1
P˜ (1 + τXN )
) 1
1−α
HNΛNQN +(
qP˜ − (1 + τXS)
)
HSΛSQN︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Profits
(B.0.2)
where the size of the incremental quality increase, q, must be sufficiently large such the limit
price exceeds the marginal cost of production. Average profits for intermediate firms in the
North is
piN = nNNpiNN+nNSpiNSnNN+nNS
≡ p¯iNQN
(B.0.3)
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where p¯iN is the profits adjusted for the average quality level on the frontier. Trade barriers
and the probability of innovation are embedded within p¯iN . A change in the rate of innovation
and imitation, alter the effective levels of human capital (HN and HS), the equilibrium
relative price of the Southern final good (P˜S = MCS), and the distribution of firms (nNN ,
nNS , and nS).
The partial effects of trade liberalization on the Northern average profits is given by,
∂p¯iN
∂τXS
= − HSΛS
nNN + nNS
nNN (q − 1)( α1− α
)(
P˜S
1 + τXS
)1/(1−α)
+ nNS
 < 0
∂p¯iN
∂τXN
= −HNΛN
(
P˜S (1 + τXN )
)1/(α−1) 1− αqP˜S (1 + τXN )
(1− α) (1 + τXN ) < 0
Southern flow profits for intermediate producers are
Domestic Profits Export Profits
piS =
︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1 + τXS − P˜
)( qP˜
1 + τXS
) 1
1−α
HSΛSQN +
︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− P˜ (1 + τXN )
)
q
1
1−αHNΛNQN
≡ p¯iSQN
(B.0.4)
where ΛS = A
1/(1−α)
S
(
α
q
)1/(1−α)
, and, as in the North, p¯iS is the quality adjusted profits
for Southern imitators. I assume the Northern tariff is sufficiently low such that the export
profits for Southern firms, given the limit price, is positive. Since only the state-of-the-art
technology is used, any good produced in the South will still have the same quality level as
the lead Northern quality frontier.
The partial effects of trade liberalization on the Northern average profits is given by,
∂p¯iS
∂τXS
=
(
qP˜S
1 + τXS
) 1
1−α
HSΛSQN
[
P˜S − α (1 + τXS)
(1− α) (1 + τXS)
]
> 0
∂p¯iS
∂τXN
= −q1/(1−α)HNΛNQN P˜S < 0
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Resources Allocated to R&D
Using the two world resource constraints, the expressions for ZN and ZS from equations
(1.4.4) and (1.4.5) are, in the North,
ZN =
[
HNΛN
(
q
α
) [
nNN + nNS
(
1
P˜S(1+τXN )
) α
1−α
+ nSq
α
1−α
]
−nNN
(
HNΛN +HSΛS
(
P˜S
1+τXS
) 1
1−α
)
−nNS
(
HSΛS +HNΛN
(
1
P˜S(1+τXN )
) 1
1−α
)
− χN
]
QN
≡ Z¯N (τXS , τXN , pI)QN
where
Z¯N
∂τXS
= − nNNHSΛS
(1− α) (1 + τXS)
(
P˜S
1 + τXS
)1/(1−α)
< 0
Z¯N
∂τXN
=
nNSHNΛN
(1− α) (1 + τXN )
(
1
P˜S (1 + τXN )
)1/(1−α) [
1− P˜S (1 + τXN )
]
> 0
and in the South,
ZS =
[
HSΛS
(
q
α
) [
nNN
(
P˜S
1+τXS
) α
1−α
+ nNS + nS
(
qP˜S
1+τXS
) α
1−α
]
−nSq 11−α
(
HSΛS
(
P˜S
1+τXS
) 1
1−α
+HNΛN
)
− χS
]
QN
≡ Z¯S (τXS , τXN , pI)QN
where
∂Z¯S
∂τXS
= − qHSΛS
P˜S (1− α)
(
P˜S
1 + τXS
)1/(1−α) [
nNN + nSqα/(1−α)
(
1− P˜S
1 + τXS
)]
< 0
where χN = CN/QN and χS = CS/QN . Z¯N and Z¯S are the quality adjusted expendi-
tures on R&D.
Balanced Trade Condition
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The relative price of the Southern final good adjusts at each point of time to balance
trade between the North and South. Expanding equation 1.4.6, P˜S implicitly solves,
qHSΛS
nNSP˜S + nNN (1 + τXS)( P˜S1 + τXS
)1/(1−α)− nSHNΛNq1/(1−α) = 0
where the partial effects of trade liberalization is given by,
∂P˜S
∂τXS
=
nNN
(
α
1−α
)(
P˜S
1+τXS
) 1
1−α
nNS + 11−αnNN
(
P˜S
1+τXS
) α
1−α
> 0
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Appendix C. Southern Trade Liberalization - All Variables
Panels 1 thru 20 show the evolution of the other key variables. The variables Ym, Xm,
Zm and Cm are presented adjusting for aggregate quality. Each, however, grows at a rate
equal to the growth rate of technologies on the frontier, Q˙N/QN . Additionally, each variable
is presented as the percentage change from the initial steady state. Figure C.1 refers to the
case in which the quality of education in the South is low, and Figure C.2 refers to the case
in which the quality of education in the South is high.
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Figure C.1: Denotes the transitional dynamics of all endogenous variables following Southern
trade liberalization when the South has a low quality of education. Given as the percentage
change from the initial steady state.
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Figure C.2: Denotes the transitional dynamics of all endogenous variables following Southern
trade liberalization when the South has a high quality of education. Given as the percentage
change from the initial steady state.
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Appendix D. Alternative Empirical Specification
As an alternative to the empirical representation given by equation (2.2.17) consider
log [Ω]t = α+ β0 log [Ω]0 + β1∆ log [a¯] + β2∆ log
[
nh
nl
]
t,0
+β3 log [QL] + β4 log [T ] + β5 log [QL] ∆ log [a¯]
+β6 log [T ] ∆ log [a¯] + β7 log [QL] log [T ] +X ′βX + ,
(D.0.1)
where log [Ω]t and log [Ω]0 are the log of inequality in year t and 0 respectively, ∆ log [a¯] is the
log change in the arrival rate of new technologies captured by the high skill factor content
of imports, ∆ log
[
nh
nl
]
t,0
is the log change in the relative number of workers considered
“skilled,” log [QL] is the log of the quality of education, and log [T ] is the log of the average
years of education. Finally, X ′ captures other exogenous variables and  is the error term.
The difference between (2.2.17) and (D.0.1) is the manner in which the log change in
inequality is specified. In (2.2.17), the dependent variable is the simple change in the log of
inequality, or ∆ log [Ω]t,0 = log [Ω]t − log [Ω]0. In (D.0.1), the dependent variable is log [Ω]t.
However, the second empirical specification controls for the initial inequality, so the model is
still testing the dynamics of inequality. Based on (D.0.1), ∆ log [Ω]t,0 = log [Ω]t−β0 log [Ω]0,
whereas in equation (2.2.17), β0 is restricted to unity.
Table D.1 presents the results based on equation (D.0.1), where the dependent variable is
the log Theil in 1990, and the log Theil in 1980 is an explanatory variable. This specification
captures the effects of new technologies and educational variables on the level of inequality
after controlling for the initial level. Thus, this regression is still focusing on the dynamics
of inequality.
The results in Table D.1 are, in general, less significant and lower in magnitude compared
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Regression Results #4
Dependent Variable: log Theil, 1990
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Theil 1980 0.753 0.751 0.796 0.746 0.761 0.744
(6.590)*** (6.590)*** (6.140)*** (6.340)*** (5.850)*** (5.000)***
skFCT 1.008 1.029 0.996 1.031 0.526 0.442
(2.730)*** (2.820)*** (2.820)*** (2.810)*** (1.540) (0.880)
QL -1.871 -1.946 -2.087 -1.953 -1.397 -1.056
(-1.530) (-1.580) (-1.650) (-1.570) (-0.910) (-0.490)
skFCT ∗QL -0.291 -0.299 -0.287 -0.302 -0.161 -0.136
(-3.030)*** (-3.150)*** (-3.090)*** (-3.100)*** (-1.390) (-0.820)
Y EARS -1.751 -1.735 -2.356 -1.708 -2.743 -2.291
(-0.690) (-0.680) (-0.870) (-0.670) (-0.960) (-0.670)
skFCT ∗ Y EARS 0.000 -0.003 -0.043 0.003 -0.014 -0.003
(0.000) (-0.030) (-0.390) (0.020) (-0.120) (-0.020)
QL ∗ Y EARS 0.376 0.383 0.487 0.384 0.614 0.513
(0.590) (0.590) (0.730) (0.590) (0.780) (0.560)
∆nhnl -0.239 -0.229 -0.228 -0.231 -0.174 -0.158
(-1.420) (-1.350) (-1.330) (-1.360) (-1.100) (-0.930)
Openness 0.053 0.081 0.051 0.033 0.006
(0.570) (0.770) (0.540) (0.330) (0.040)
GDPp.c. (1980) 0.174 -0.100
(0.900) (-0.330)
Advanced -0.027
(-0.190)
Mideast -0.037 -0.010
(-0.130) (-0.030)
Africa -0.015 -0.047
(-0.060) (-0.180)
Latin America 0.318 0.321
(1.600) (1.640)
Asia -0.243 -0.305
(-1.300) (-1.030)
Constant 6.852 6.856 6.097 6.830 4.961 4.562
(1.370) (1.390) (1.280) (1.380) (0.920) (0.770)
N 59 59 59 59 59 59
R squared 0.784 0.786 0.789 0.786 0.817 0.817
Table D.1: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** 5 percent,
* 10 percent. OLS estimation is used for each regression with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the log of the Theil index in 1990.
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to the results in Table 2.4. For example, the average years of education does not significantly
explain the level of inequality in 1990 after controlling for the initial level of inequality. The
loss of significance is most likely due to endogeneity between the initial level of inequality
in 1980 and the average years of education in 1980. Additionally, the direct impact of the
quality of education is only significant at the fifteen percent level. The skilled factor content
of trade is, however, significant at the one percent level and of the expected sign, particularly
in columns (1) - (4). Its interaction with the quality of education is also negative and highly
significant. Thus, the key result that the quality of education is important to reducing the
impact of new technologies on inequality still holds for both specifications 2.2.17 and D.0.1.
Finally, the inclusion of the regional dummy variables, columns (5) and (6), reduces the
significance of each variable of interest.
Table D.2 documents the results for equation (D.0.1) using the log Theil in 1995 as the
dependent variable controlling for the initial level of 1980 inequality.
The key results linking the arrival rate of new technologies and the quality of educa-
tion to the dynamics of income inequality are again found in Table D.2. A higher skilled
factor content of trade increases inequality, yet this effect is lessened by a higher quality
of education. In contrast to Table D.2, the direct effect of the quality of education on the
dynamics of inequality is negative and significant at the five percent level. The average years
of education and its interactions are, once again, not significant for any of the specifications.
D.0.1 Results - Dropping Insignificant Interaction
Tables D.3 and D.4 test equation (2.2.17) for the time intervals 1980-1990 and 1980-1995
respectively without the interaction between Y EARS and skFCT .
Using the values from the column (3) regressions on Tables D.3 and D.4, Figure D.1
plots the actual log change of inequality against the predicted log change of inequality. The
predictions of the model closely follow the actual change of inequality between 1980 and
1990, as well as 1980 and 1995.
Improving the quality of education for developing countries is especially important during
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Regression Results #5
Dependent Variable: log Theil, 1995
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Theil 1980 0.493 0.488 0.518 0.531 0.513 0.507
(3.460)*** (3.360)*** (3.350)*** (3.650)*** (3.340)*** (3.020)***
skFCT 1.996 1.969 1.826 1.970 1.605 1.565
(3.000)*** (2.850)*** (2.510)** (2.770)*** (1.750)** (1.620)
QL -5.078 -5.023 -4.991 -5.005 -4.215 -4.038
(-2.390)** (-2.290)** (-2.280)** (-2.230)** (-1.550) (-1.400)
skFCT ∗QL -0.504 -0.503 -0.473 -0.496 -0.351 -0.339
(-2.940)*** (-2.870)*** (-2.640)** (-2.660)** (-1.480) (-1.300)
Y EARS -6.216 -5.997 -6.300 -6.057 -6.396 -6.156
(-1.430) (-1.310) (-1.400) (-1.340) (-1.310) (-1.220)
skFCT ∗ Y EARS -0.096 -0.089 -0.114 -0.113 -0.219 -0.214
(-0.500) (-0.450) (-0.580) (-0.580) (-1.020) (-0.990)
QL ∗ Y EARS 1.472 1.433 1.473 1.413 1.391 1.336
(1.420) (1.330) (1.400) (1.310) (1.190) (1.110)
∆nhnl -0.125 -0.115 -0.120 -0.109 -0.106 -0.100
(-0.750) (-0.690) (-0.740) (-0.660) (-0.670) (-0.550)
Openness 0.034 0.074 0.048 0.016 0.005
(0.360) (0.730) (0.510) (0.150) (0.040)
GDPp.c. (1980) 0.195 -0.042
(0.710) (-0.110)
Advanced 0.189
(1.010)
Mideast -0.072 -0.064
(-0.280) (-0.230)
Africa 0.135 0.121
(0.390) (0.370)
Latin America -0.061 -0.060
(-0.270) (-0.260)
Asia -0.365 -0.394
(-1.600) (-1.200)
Constant 18.872 18.380 16.485 18.529 16.435 16.141
(2.100)** (1.940)* (1.640) (1.950)* (1.470) (1.450)
N 52 52 52 52 52 52
R squared 0.652 0.652 0.658 0.659 0.677 0.677
Table D.2: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** 5 percent,
* 10 percent. OLS estimation is used for each regression with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the log of the Theil index in 1995.
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Regression Results #6
Dependent Variable: ∆ log Theil, 1980 - 1990
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
skFCT 1.328 1.351 1.274 1.335 0.759 0.854
(2.700)*** (2.800)*** (3.280)*** (2.790)*** (1.660) (1.650)
QL -3.977 -4.058 -3.725 -3.809 -2.959 -3.252
(-3.530)*** (-3.570)*** (-3.390)*** (-3.360)*** (-2.000)* (-1.820)*
skFCT ∗QL -0.368 -0.377 -0.383 -0.376 -0.226 -0.260
(-2.950)*** (-3.030)*** (-3.660)*** (-3.060)*** (-1.800)* (-1.650)
Y EARS -5.845 -5.827 -4.902 -5.176 -5.705 -5.875
(-3.090)*** (-3.120)*** (-2.480)** (-2.840)*** (-2.180)** (-2.190)**
QL ∗ Y EARS 1.498 1.506 1.226 1.320 1.427 1.464
(2.920)*** (2.950)*** (2.260)** (2.640)** (2.030)** (2.020)**
∆nhnl -0.222 -0.213 -0.245 -0.213 -0.133 -0.158
(-1.320) (-1.270) (-1.410) (-1.250) (-0.800) (-0.890)
Openness 0.048 0.097 0.055 0.032 0.064
(0.440) (0.890) (0.520) (0.290) (0.410)
GDPp.c. (1980) 0.305 0.113
(2.040)** (0.430)
Advanced 0.152
(1.080)
Mideast -0.190 -0.208
(-0.690) (-0.690)
Africa -0.305 -0.245
(-1.370) (-0.990)
Latin America 0.157 0.172
(0.700) (0.740)
Asia -0.426 -0.333
(-2.460)** (-1.090)
Constant 15.484 15.526 11.296 14.568 11.616 11.557
(3.590)*** (3.710)*** (2.660)*** (3.480)*** (2.230)** (2.290)**
N 59 59 59 59 59 59
R squared 0.191 0.194 0.244 0.204 0.320 0.323
Table D.3: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** 5 percent,
* 10 percent. OLS estimation is used for each regression with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the log change of the Theil index between 1980 and 1990.
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Regression Results #7
Dependent Variable: ∆ log Theil, 1980 - 1995
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
skFCT 3.174 3.179 2.717 2.926 2.559 2.699
(4.990)*** (5.060)*** (4.070)*** (4.230)*** (2.890)*** (3.060)***
QL -9.808 -9.807 -9.049 -8.708 -8.042 -8.738
(-5.190)*** (-5.120)*** (-4.700)*** (-4.250)*** (-2.940)*** (-3.130)***
skFCT ∗QL -0.828 -0.828 -0.751 -0.777 -0.685 -0.744
(-4.970)*** (-4.960)*** (-4.410)*** (-4.270)*** (-2.960)*** (-3.120)***
Y EARS -13.232 -13.247 -12.187 -11.025 -10.920 -11.513
(-4.230)*** (-4.180)*** (-3.850)*** (-3.530)*** (-2.880)*** (-3.110)***
QL ∗ Y EARS 3.502 3.503 3.197 2.894 2.858 2.999
(4.190)*** (4.130)*** (3.720)*** (3.470)*** (2.820)*** (3.040)***
∆nhnl -0.136 -0.139 -0.154 -0.130 -0.099 -0.136
-0.790 (-0.810 (-0.980 (-0.790 (-0.630 (-0.790
Openness -0.010 0.085 0.037 0.043 0.114
(-0.080) (0.590) (0.300) (0.320) (0.710)
GDPp.c. (1980) 0.405 0.267
(1.650) (0.740)
Advanced 0.439
(2.190)**
Mideast -0.485 -0.504
(-1.600) (-1.610)
Africa -0.485 -0.391
(-1.540) (-1.250)
Latin America -0.304 -0.286
(-1.040) (-0.960)
Asia -0.572 -0.366
(-2.190)** (-1.020)
Constant 37.845 37.903 30.661 33.368 31.177 31.023
(5.270)*** (5.230)*** (3.610)*** (4.280)*** (3.020)*** (3.050)***
N 52 52 52 52 52 52
R squared 0.344 0.344 0.378 0.395 0.407 0.415
Table D.4: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** 5 percent,
* 10 percent. OLS estimation is used for each regression with robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is the log change of the Theil index between 1980 and 1995.
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Figure D.1: The values on the x-axis are the actual log change of inequality for either
1980-1990 or 1980-1995. The values on the y-axis correspond to the predicted log change of
inequality over the same time interval.
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times of greater technological progress. The 1980s was a time of large scale trade liberaliza-
tion which significantly changed the arrival rate of new technologies in developing countries.
A higher quality of education in Asia compared to Latin America and Africa meant that
the growth of inequality would be less severe. In fact, referring back to Figure 1.1, this is
precisely what is found in the data. While a higher quantity of education does significantly
reduce the growth of inequality, during times of rapid technological change, it is the quality
of education has a greater impact. This result has an important policy implication. Im-
proving the quality of education during periods of rapid technological progress is crucial for
emerging and developing countries concerned with the effects of the new technologies on
income inequality.
Consider the differences between Indonesia, whose quality of education is 42.99, and
Brazil, whose quality of education is slightly less, 36.6. Using column (4) from Table D.4, a
ten percent increase in the skilled factor content of trade increases the growth of inequality
by 1.2 percent in Brazil, but only by 0.03 percent in Indonesia. Small differences in the
quality of education have important implications for the growth of inequality associated
with technological change. Furthermore, using column (4) of Table D.4, a ten percent
increase in the quality of education reduces the growth of inequality, on average, by 18.7
percent in Africa (with a very low quantity of education), but only 4.6 percent in advanced
countries.
Tables D.3 and D.4 also show systematic differences in the growth of inequality between
developed and developing countries. For example, the log of the real GDP per capita in 1980
is positive and significant in Table D.3, while the dummy for advanced economies is positive
and significant in Table D.4. The interaction between the factor content of trade and the
quality of education remains a crucial factor in the dynamics of inequality, however there is
evidence that there may be other factors that increase the growth of inequality in developed
countries more than in developing countries. Moreover, the dummy for Asia is negative and
significant in both Table D.3 and Table D.4. After controlling for the quality of education
and the proxy for changes in the arrival rate of new technologies, the growth of inequality
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was less in Asia relative to the other regions. Tables D.3 and D.4, again, consistently show
overall trade openness to be insignificant in the cross-country regressions.
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